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THE GRIN WITHOUT THE CAT: CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES
FROM Toxic ExPosuRE WITHOUT PRESENT INJURY
BILL CHARLES WELLS*
In the past several years, toxic tort litigation has involved plaintiffs
attempting to gain damages in cases where neither impact nor present
injury can be shown.' Non-injury damage claims may be for medical
monitoring,' increased or enhanced risk of disease, or emotional distress.'
Claims for emotional distress include claims for psychological injury from
the awareness of exposure and the alleged increased risk of the disease.
These damage theories are tied together by the plaintiff's failure to
show a current physical injury caused by exposure to the chemical or
chemicals in question.4 Proving that a particular injury is caused by
exposure to a small dose of any particular chemical is difficult; proving
that a specific level of exposure will cause future injury is even more
* Mr. Wells is currently the Chief of Environmental Law for the Sacramento Air Logistics
Center. Mr. Wells received his B.S. from Old Dominion University in 1979, his J.D.
from the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary in 1982, and
received his L.L.M. from George Washington University in 1993.
1. D. Alan Rudlin & Linsey W. Stravitz, Novel Toxic Tort and Superfund Claims, in
ENviRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT CLAIMs: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1991 AND
BEYOND 163, 175 (Prac. L. Inst. 1991).
2. The terms "medical surveillance," "diagnostic testing," "preventive monitoring" and
"medical monitoring" are used interchangeably by the courts and commentators. All of
these terms represent the general process through which medical testing protocols are
funded for the alleged or potential victims of exposure to toxic substances. See Allan T.
Slagel, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of
Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. L.J. 849, 850 n.8 (1988). This Article will utilize the term
medical monitoring.
3. This Article will consider emotional distress as an element of damages in negligence
or strict liability, or as in some jurisdictions, the independent tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. The intentional infliction of emotional distress raises different
issues (mostly related to fraud) that are beyond the scope of this Article.
Some courts draw a distinction between claims based solely on a simple fear of
developing a disease, which do not require expert testimony to support the claim, and
claims in which the plaintiff's distress amounts to a phobia, which do require that the
claim be supported by expert testimony. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481
So. 2d 517, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d
495, 499 (N.J. Super. 1985).
4. Rudlin & Stravitz, supra note 1.
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difficult.' These claims for "non impact damages" attempt to avoid the
necessity of proving causation by doing away with the need to prove
injury.6 With apologies to Lewis Carrol, this approach presents the
question of whether there can be the grin, without the bother and
inconvenience of the cat.7 This Article will survey the general area of
claims for common law tort damages without present injury due to toxic
exposure as developed in the various states.' The Article will then discuss
the ability to claim medical monitoring under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA")9 and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA").'0 The Article
will also consider the effect of the Federal Tort Claims Act and its limited
5. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 851 n.2 (1984); Cottle v. Superior
Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also
I AMERICAN LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 321 (1991),
in which the authors question the comparatively small number of toxic tort actions and
conclude that the fact that "environmental tort cases are difficult to win" results in fewer
cases being brought.
6. See Rudlin & Stravitz, supra note 1, at 186; see also Jay Zinns, Comment, Close
Encounters of the Toxic Kind"--Toward an Amelioration of Substantive and Procedural
Barriers for Latent Toxic Injury Plaintiffs, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 822, 853 (1981) (concluding
that only governmental entities can afford to prove proximate cause in toxic tort cases
because of the expense of such proof).
7. See LEWIS CARROL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE
LOOKING-GLASS 56 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1970) (1865) ("Well! I've often seen a cat
without a grin,' thought Alice, 'but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I
ever saw in all my life!").
8. See infra parts II. through IV.
9. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992K (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). See infra part V. This Article will not discuss in
detail the option of claiming medical monitoring under the various state law analogues to
CERCLA or pursuing medical monitoring in the occupational setting (independent of tort
liability). For an example of such a state statute, see Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act
("HCSA"), 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6020.101-6020.1305 (1993). In representing
either a plaintiff or defendant in a medical monitoring action, however, the state
"Superfund" law must be considered. For example, in Pennsylvania, a court has held that
the HSCA does provide for recovery of both medical and legal costs. Manella v. Sequa
Corp., Pa. Ct. C.P., Bucks County, No. 89-1069-21-2, Oct. 20, 1992, 7 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 24, at 715 (Nov. 11, 1992).
waiver of sovereign immunity" on the viability of these claims when
asserted in a suit against the United States.'2
I. BACKGROUND ON ToXIC TORTS AND ALTERNATIVE
DAMAGE THEoRIEs
A. Toxic Torts in General
Before addressing the area of damages in toxic tort litigation, one
must first address the threshold issue of what a "toxic tort" is. A toxic tort
is a tort claim that results from the exposure of the plaintiff to toxic
(chemical or radioactive) substances because of the defendant's actions."
The claim is usually based on a negligence theory, but on occasion
plaintiffs have asserted claims under a strict liability theory or under a
specific state statute.1 4 Negligence as a cause of action traditionally has
four parts: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and injury. 5 To the
extent that claims for damages without proof of present injury are
recognized, the elements of the cause of action are reduced to two.
Without a requirement to prove injury, no requirement exists to show that
toxic exposure is the proximate cause of the injury. The duty element is
easily satisfied if one assumes that people have a duty not to expose others
to hazardous chemicals. Thus, the plaintiff only needs to show a breach
of that duty through proof of exposure to toxic substances and proof of
damages. Damages may include the amount of money needed to
compensate the plaintiff for future medical expenses, increased risk of
future health problems, and fear of developing disease in the future. 6
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
12. See infra part V1.
13. See Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 376 n. 1 (1986). For information
on torts in general, see W. PAGE KEET'ON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
14. Claims other then negligence are beyond the Federal Tort Claims Act's limited
waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). See infra part VI; see generally
LESTER JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS §§ 211.01, 225 (1977).
15. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1991).
16. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (NJ. 1987); Albert H. Parnell et
al., Medical Monitoring: A Dangerous Trend, FOR THE DEFENSE, April 1992, at 6.
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The plaintiff must also show that the chemical in question has the potential
to cause future injury, which is much easier than showing that it has
caused or will cause an injury.
B. Special Characteristics of Toxic Torts
Toxic tort claims arise from a wide variety of factual situations and
under differing legal theories,'7  but these claims have several
distinguishing characteristics that set them apart from other tort
litigation.'8 These characteristics are important not only to academics but
also to practitioners because they suggest and support additional theories
of liability and defense. These characteristics also affect the way litigation
is managed by both court and counsel. 9
The first characteristic of a toxic tort is that it involves injuries that
allegedly stem from exposure to harmful substances."0 In acute exposure
cases, for example, the catastrophe that occurred at the Union Carbide
plant in Bhopal, India,2 the factual issues presented are not greatly
different from those of a bus or airplane accident. Acute exposure cases
usually involve questions about who was at fault for the accident, and are
less concerned with establishing that harmful effects resulted from the
incident. In the case of chronic exposure to a toxic substance that results
in latent injury, 2 however, two questions are important: Who was
17. For example, toxic torts may involve exposure through air, water or soil
contamination. These torts may involve chemicals or radioactive substances, and may be
founded in either negligence or strict liability, or some combination of both. See
generally Allan Kanner, Emerging Conceptions of Latent Personal Injuries in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 343 (1987).
18. MICHAEL DORE, THE LAW OF Toxic TORTS § 2.02 (1992).
19. Id.
20. Wendell B. Alcorn, Jr., Liability Theories for Toxic Torts, 3 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 3, 3 (1988).
21. See In re Union Carbide, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1986).
22. The latency period is the interval of time between a person's exposure to the toxic
substance responsible for the manifestation of a disease, and the appearance of the first
signs of the disease by definitive symptoms or actual detection. See F. HOMBURGER ET
AL., A GUIDE To GENERAL ToxIcoLoGY 203 (1983).
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responsible for the exposure? And, could the toxic substance involved in
a particular incident have caused the injuries claimed?23
The second characteristic of toxic torts is that most cases involve
the exposure of large numbers of people to similar amounts of a
chemical.2 This characteristic is important in an administrative and
practical sense because it affects the way lawsuits are litigated.
Practitioners may decide to pursue a class action suie or a consolidated
action26 based upon the perceived benefits of either form of action in
particular factual circumstances." The huge amounts of money at stake
may encourage the parties to settle when multiple plaintiffs are
involved.8 In such cases, adverse rulings can bankrupt companies, drive
products from the market,29 and destroy entire industries;" defendants
become eager to settle. In addition, defendants are more inclined to settle
because of their fear that litigation will keep new products from the
market, discourage research and development, and damage the competitive
position of American companies.31
A third characteristic of toxic tort litigation is that the full
consequences of the exposure may not be immediately apparent. Many of
the diseases in question have long latency periods, creating problems in
determining causation.32 Another complication associated with long
latency periods is that the connection between exposure and illness in any
given individual may not be linear. For example, a direct dose/response
23. See, e.g., Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Colo. 1990), affd,
972 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1992).
24. Exceptions exist. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.
1986) (involving both a single individual and a single large scale exposure). In Hagerty,
a tankerman was "drenched" in a hazardous substance when a valve on his employer's
barge malfunctioned. Id. at 317.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
27. See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984); 1 AMERICAN LAW
INST., supra note 5, at 324.
28. In re Fernald Litig., No. C-1-85-149, 1989 WL 267039 (S.D. Ohio June 30, 1989).
29. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 128
(1991).
30. See generally PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY
ON TRIAL (1985).
31. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worked;
What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, n.104 (1991).
32. Kanner, supra note 17, at 347.
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relationship may not be determinable, and there may be a threshold level
of exposure below which no harm can be shown. In addition, the passage
of time allows both for loss of evidence and intervening causes.33 The
passage of time between the exposure and the onset of symptoms may also
lead to problems in identifying the source of the substance, even though
its nature may be known. For example, a plaintiff may know that her
mother took DES, but may not be able to determine who made the DES
or who sold it.34
A fourth characteristic of the average toxic tort suit is that the
evidence used to support claims of harm, and to show causation when
required, may not be generally accepted by the mainstream scientific
community. This evidentiary difficulty is driven by a combination of the
amount of money involved and the difficulty in determining the
mechanism of injury or the source of the substances.3"
The fifth characteristic relates to the unpredictability of the outcome
and the amount of money involved in toxic tort litigation.36 Often the
plaintiff's injuries are so serious or the plaintiff is so sympathetic (or
conversely, the defendant is so unsympathetic) that traditional tort defenses
such as contributory negligence, statute of limitations, and requirement of
actual injury, are evaluated critically by the court. For example, in
33. See Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific
Uncertainty in Hazardous Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 469 (1988).
34. ROBERT MEYERS, D.E.S. THE BITrER PILL 217 (1983). DES is short for
Diethylstilbestrol, or diethyl stilbestrol, a synthetic estrogen which duplicates the actions
of natural estrogens. DES is used for estrogen replacement therapy, but was formerly
used to prevent miscarriage in pregnancy. DES is no longer used for the prevention of
miscarriages due to the possibility that its use caused cancer in the reproductive organs
of children whose mothers took DES. NEW AMERICAN POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY
(1978).
35. HUBER, supra note 29,. at 192; see Clifford J. Zatz, Defenses on the Frontiers of
Science, 19 LITIG. 1, 13 (Fall 1992); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (holding that general
acceptance is not a necessary precondition to admissibility of scientific evidence and that
the trial judge must insure that the expert's testimony rests on a reliable foundation).
36. HUBER, supra note 29, at 118 ("Smarter plaintiff's lawyers don't want a trial; a trial,
after all, carries with it the risk of losing everything if the theories of a William McBride
or an Alan Done [plaintiff's experts of whom Huber was very critical in his book] don't
quite persuade. But defendants don't want any part of a huge trial either, partly because
legal fees in this kind of litigation are astronomical, partly because there's always some
risk, no matter how solid your scientific case may be, that you will still lose.").
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Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co.,3" the court broadly interpreted the
wrongful death statute to avoid the statute of limitations." Similarly, in
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp.,3 the court held that "subcellular
injury i'' met the physical injury requirement for the increased risk of
future disease.4'
The sixth characteristic is that all toxic torts are administrative in
nature. The size, nature, and complexity of toxic tort actions can cause
administrative and procedural problems for the court system dealing with
the litigation.
Finally, toxic torts often lead to insurance coverage disputes. These
disputes arise because of the difficulty in determining when or by what
mechanism the injury occurred. These disputes are also fueled by
arguments about which insurance carrier should defend and pay the claim,
issues that surface because of the practice of large industrial concerns of
purchasing their insurance coverage on a competitive bid basis and
frequently changing insurers.42
The possibility of disputes about insurance coverage is particularly
troublesome because of the danger of defendants filing bankruptcy or
otherwise becoming judgment-proof. 43 For example, a plaintiff seeking
punitive damages may need to show that certain acts were intentional.
Damages resulting from intentional acts are excluded from coverage under
nearly all insurance policies."' Many insurance polices also exclude
37. 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
38. Il at 1223-24. The court did not allow the plaintiffs to recover for the mental
distress they suffered in watching their children's illness, nor for their own minimally
enhanced future risk of disease. The court did allow recovery for the possibility that
existing diseases would increase in severity. Id. at 1228-32.
39. 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984).
40. "Subcellular injury" resulted when exposure to radiation from mine waste used as fill
caused injury at the level of internal cell structure, without any other indicia that injury
had occurred. Il at 17.
41. Id.
42. Eugene R. Anderson et al., Procedural, Practical and Strategic Issues in Insurance
Coverage Disputes Stemming From Mass Tort Actions, in INSURANCE, ExcESS AND
REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 1992, at 17-26 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 427, 1992).
43. See generally RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON
SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
44. Scot C. Stirling, Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage and the Problem
of Environmental Liabilities, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395, 459-62 (1990); see also Transamerica
Inc. Group v. Meere, 694 P.2d 181, 186 (Ariz. 1984).
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punitive damages from their coverage." In proving whether the actions
involved were intentional or merely negligent, the plaintiff and the
defendant may be bound by a court's finding that the acts occurred. 6 If
the defendant's financial strength is questionable, however, the plaintiff
will need to stress negligent acts to avoid the hollow victory of a judgment
for which no source of payment exists.47 In some states the law forbids
insurance coverage of punitive damages on grounds of public policy.4"
A finding that the acts occurred may result in additional exposure
to liability, such as corporate or individual exposure to civil fines or
criminal liability.49 The same showing of willful and intentional action
that avoids the insurance coverage may also support personal civil or
criminal liability for a corporate officer under the environmental laws.5"
C. Toxic Tort Damages and Alternative Damage Theories
Toxic tort damages include traditional tort damages, such as lost
wages, past and future medical expenses, and emotional distress, including
pain and suffering." Other elements of damages are also available in
45. Grace M. Giesel, The Knowledge of Insurers and the Posture of the Parties in the
Determination of the Insurability of Punitive Damages, 39 KAN. L. REV. 355, 388 (1991).
46. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 688 (4th ed. 1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982).
47. See SOBOL, supra note 43, at 67.
48. This prohibition may be by statute as in North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07
(1989), or Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.182 (Baldwin 1982). Case law may also
establish such a prohibition as in Florida and many other states. See Nicholson v.
American Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). For a
complete listing of the various state rules on the insurability of punitive damages, see
chapter 5 of RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, A STATE BY STATE GUIDE
TO LAW AND PRACTICE (1991).
The rationale for such prohibitions is that allowing insurance against punitive
damages may lessen the deterrent effect of such awards. See Northwestern Nat'i Casualty
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1962).
49. DORE, supra note 18, at § 2.02; see also Arnold W. Reitze, supra note 31, at 1569
(in the area of "buying off' claimants for equitable relief, this exposure was referred to
as "the extortion value of equitable relief," and that value is even greater when the facts
which might be revealed carry with them the possibility of senior executives facing
criminal sanctions and jail).
50. See Federal Indictment Hits Company Officials with Criminal Charges, $15.2 Million
in Fines, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1373 (Sept. 11, 1992) (discussing a case in which toxic
tort defendants also faced a criminal indictment).
51. DORE, supra note 18, at § 2.02.
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toxic tort cases.52 These various alternative measures of damages--
medical monitoring, enhanced risk of future disease, and emotional
distress--have developed in response to the difficulty of showing injury and
causation in the case of exposure to chemicals in less than acutely toxic
amounts. Although the theories differ in how they attempt to quantify and
compensate for these alleged injuries, these measures also have many
characteristics in common.
An action for medical monitoring seeks to recover only the cost of
periodic medical examinations needed to detect the onset of physical injury
from chemical exposure. The aim of medical monitoring is to compensate
the plaintiff for the cost of any special medical procedures that may lead
to early detection of the diseases in question. 3 The cause of action for
medical monitoring assumes that earlier detection will lead to earlier
diagnosis and an improved chance of successful treatment.54
By comparison, a claim for enhanced risk of disease seeks payment for
the anticipated harm itself, perhaps discounted by the possibility that the
injury may never occur. For example, a $10,000 injury with a ten percent
possibility of occurring would be "worth" $1,000.' 5 With medical
monitoring, the question is whether the plaintiff needs medical tests to
protect his health due to exposure to the defendant's toxic substance. In
a claim for enhanced risk, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has
an increased chance of developing disease because of his exposure to the
defendant's toxic substance. 6 Damages for emotional distress, in cases
in which no symptoms of the toxin-related disease presently exist, are
based on the assumption that once the plaintiff knows he has been exposed
or may have been exposed to a toxic substance, he will worry about future
health effects that may result from the exposure.
52. These damage theories are rare in traditional tort litigation. Some commentators have
suggested that this rarity is undesirable, and that if one can recover for the fear of a
cancer one may never get, one should be able to recover for the fear of having to share
the highway with a driver that you believe to be reckless. See, e.g., William H.
Armstrong, Tort Damages for Injuries Not Yet Suffered, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 26,
53 (1988).
53. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990) cert. denied
sub non. General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 961 (1991); Slagel, supra note 2.
54. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard, 916 F.2d at 849-52; Slagel, supra note 2, at 867.
55. In re Paoli R.R. Yard, 916 F.2d at 850.
56. Id.
1994] TOXIC TORTS 293
294 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol.18:285
II. ALTERNATIVE THEORY ONE: MEDICAL MoNrORING DAMAGES
Medical monitoring is the process of conducting a test or series of
tests to follow changes in a patient's condition.57 In tort law, medical
monitoring damages include payment for the testing required to detect
latent diseases and protect the plaintiff from additional harm." The
theory of medical monitoring developed in response to the perceived
inability of traditional tort law to address the problem of potential injury
due to exposure to hazardous substances. In normal tort litigation, one
must show injury before claiming to have suffered a legal harm. In some
cases such as DES or genetic injury cases, however, generations may pass
between exposure to a hazardous substance and eventual injury.59
Medical monitoring claims may be either an element of legal
damages, an independent tort, or equitable relief. These differing forms
of the claim exist because medical monitoring developed from several
different theoretical roots. Although the states have differing requirements
for the award of medical monitoring damages, one fact sets medical
monitoring apart from any other claim in toxic substances personal injury
litigation: No requirement exists to show present injury. This lack of a
present injury requirement settles the causation issue and makes the
plaintiffs burden of proof easier to meet.
In essence, the cause of action for medical monitoring requires a
showing that (1) the plaintiff was exposed to hazardous substances; (2) the
defendant was more likely than not the source of the hazardous substances;
and (3) some form of expanded medical testing and follow-up is needed.6
The trade-off for the reduced evidentiary burden is that recovery under a
medical monitoring theory is limited to the expected cost of this testing.
61
In jurisdictions that have rejected medical monitoring as both an
independent tort and a separate remedy, the courts have viewed medical
57. Myrton F. Beeller & Robert Sappenfield, Medical Monitoring, What it is, How Can
it Be Improved?, 87 AM. J. OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 285 (1987).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989) (plaintiff's birth defects caused by ingestion of
Benedectin by mother); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(plaintiff's increased risk of cancer caused by ingestion of DES by mother).
60. See Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984).
61. DORE, supra note 18, at § 7.05[l].
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monitoring as a form of future medical expenses.62 In these jurisdictions
the plaintiff must meet all the traditional requirements for recovery in tort,
including causation. The plaintiff must also prove that the monitoring
requested is medically necessary and required due to his exposure to the
hazardous substances released by the defendant.63
A. Early Development of the Medical Monitoring Concept
The modem development of medical monitoring is an example of
the law of unintended consequences. Academics and practitioners agree
that the origins of modem medical monitoring theory and litigation are
traceable to Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp."
and Ayers v. Township of Jackson.65
Friends for All Children was not a toxic tort case. Instead, the case
involved the crash of a Lockheed C5A military transport aircraft." The
plaintiffs alleged that the children who survived the crash were at risk for
a neurological disorder generically known as Minimal Brain Dysfunction
("MBD"). This risk was a result of the explosive decompression and
62. Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 876 (1991) (stating that a "claim for medical surveillance costs is simply a claim for
future damages. Plaintiff correctly points out that the law of West Virginia allows the
recovery of the reasonable value of future medical expenses necessitated by the
defendant's wrong."); see also Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal.
1993) (allowing medical monitoring claim when the need for monitoring is a reasonably
certain result of exposure and the monitoring itself is reasonable); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (denying class certification because
necessity for medical monitoring for one exposed individual did not imply necessity for
medical monitoring of similarly, but not identically exposed individuals).
63. Ball, 958 F.2d at 39.
64. 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
65. 525 A.2d 287 (NJ. 1987). Ayers was the first case to apply medical monitoring in
a toxic tort case.
66. Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 819. The C5A was being used to evacuate
Vietnamese orphans from Saigon during "Operation Babylift" in the closing days of the
Vietnam war. The airplane crashed due to the failure of the locking mechanism that kept
the doors and cargo ramp closed. Most of the passengers where killed, but at least 149
survived and were brought to the United States by a second airplane. Id.
19941 295
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hypoxia the children suffered during the air crash.67 After several years
of litigation involving numerous appeals and remands, the plaintiffs moved
for partial summary judgment on Lockheed's liability for diagnostic
examinations and medical treatment" and asked for "preliminary relief
ordering Lockheed to pay for such examinations and treatment pendente
lite."69
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment on the issue of diagnostic testing, but not on the issue of medical
treatment.7" The court did not enter judgment as to the exact amount of
Lockheed's liability to the individual plaintiffs,7' but did order Lockheed
to create a fund to cover the costs of the diagnostic examinations.72 The
court refused to grant summary judgment on the issue of medical treatment
because Lockheed continued to dispute the fact that the plaintiffs were
suffering from MBD and that the crash had caused the MBD."3
The appellate court affirmed on narrow grounds. In upholding the
order for the injunction, the court emphasized that this remedy was
extraordinary, and that the inherent equitable powers of the court gave the
district court the authority to order this interim relief.74 The court
justified the remedy by the fact that Lockheed had stipulated to liability.7
The panel stressed the narrowness of its holding:
We hold only that a preliminary injunction requiring the
defendant to create a fund to pay for diagnostic exams is
proper when the defendant has been held liable for the costs
67. Explosive decompression occurs when the structure of an airplane is punctured or
otherwise fails, and pressure is suddenly released. The higher pressure in the aircraft is
released and rushes out. The effect is similar to popping the top on a can of soda that has
been shaken, except that the substance under pressure is air and not soda. Hypoxia
is a diminished amount of oxygen in the blood. NEW AMERICAN POCKET MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (1978).
68. Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 820.
69. Id. As grounds for the pendente lite relief, the plaintiffs alleged and offered evidence
that the children would not benefit from any therapy that might be suggested after testing
unless the testing was accomplished before the children reached adolescence. Id. at 825.
70. Id. at 822.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 822-23.
75. Id. at 822.
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of such examinations and when the delay inherent in trying
the case to compute the amount of the defendant's liability
will result in irreparable injury. Moreover, under our
holding, plaintiffs must show that they meet traditional
standards governing the award of equitable relief, and the
District Court must seek to minimize the prospect that a
plaintiff will receive any funds that a trier of fact will
subsequently fail to award.76
Ayers v. Township of Jackson" was the first case in which a court
awarded medical monitoring damages in the toxic tort context. Factually,
Ayers was a toxic tort action in which the township, through its improper
operation of a landfill, contaminated the groundwater consumed by the
plaintiffs." When the township discovered the contamination, it informed
the plaintiffs and provided an alternative water source.79 The plaintiffs
sued seeking damages for their increased risk of disease due to the
contaminants in the water and for medical monitoring expenses.80 The
trial court found that New Jersey law did not allow the action for increased
risk of disease and granted summary judgment for the township on that
issue.8 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue
of medical monitoring damages, and the court awarded a lump sum
payment.82 The appellate division reversed on the grounds that damages
for medical monitoring were too speculative.83
The New Jersey Supreme Court reinstated the award for medical
monitoring expenses.84 Relying on Friends for All Children85 and
76. Id. at 831.
77. 525 A.2d 287 (NJ. 1987).
78. Id. at 293.
79. Id. For over two years the plaintiffs were forced to make do with a primitive
temporary water system that involved having 40 gallon barrels of water dropped off at the
road side, which the residents then carried into their homes. Although not relevant to the
issue of medical monitoring, this fact did support an award for their inconvenience,
notwithstanding a statutory bar of "pain and suffering" damages against municipalities
under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. Id. at 294.
80. Ua at 291.
81. Id. The enhanced risk claims will be discussed infra part IV.
82. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 297.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 312, 315.
85. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
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Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,86 the court awarded medical monitoring
expenses for the increased risk alone, but did not award substantive
damages for that same increased risk." The court set forth factors to
consider in determining the reasonableness of medical expense: "[t]he
likelihood of disease ..., the significance and extent of the exposure to
chemicals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases for
which individuals are at risk and the value of early diagnosis."88 The
court specified that the plaintiffs must show these factors with "reliable
expert testimony."89 The court added:
Even if the likelihood that these plaintiffs would contract
cancer were only slightly higher than the national average,
medical intervention may be completely appropriate in view
of the attendant circumstances. A physician treating a
Legler-area child who drank contaminated well water for
several years could hardly be faulted for concluding that
child should be examined annually to assure early detection
of symptoms of disease.9"
The New Jersey Supreme Court also addressed the issue of the
form of payment of the medical monitoring expenses.9' Even though the
court affirmed the trial court's award of a lump sum payment, the court
emphasized that in future cases it would prefer the use of a court-
supervised fund mechanism as the remedy.92 Administrative convenience
86. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). Reserve Mining was a regulatory case in which the
court upheld an injunction despite the fact that "[i]n assessing probabilities in this case,
it cannot be said that the probability of harm is more likely than not." Ayers, 525 A.2d
at 312 (quoting Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 520).
87. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312.
88. Id.
89. Id. What constitutes "reliable expert testimony" is the subject of its own massive
debate. See generally HUBER, supra note 29 (discussing the use of fringe science and
pseudoscience by lawyers).
90. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 314-15. Ayers was concerned with a claim against a municipality under the
New Jersey Tort Claims Act. Although the court said that the use of the fund mechanism
to pay medical monitoring claims was particularly well-suited to claims under the New
Jersey Tort Claims Act, the court did not say "only under the [New Jersey] Tort Claims
Act." Id.
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and judicial economy influenced the court's decision to uphold the lump
sum payment in this particular case.9" In stating its preference for a
court-supervised fund, the court concluded that a trial court's authority to
order such a fund derived from the court's equitable powers.94 The court
quoted with approval Judge Weinstien's opinion from In re Agent OrangeProd. Liab. Litig. :95
[S]ince "implementation of any distribution plan based on
traditional tort principles is impossible because of a virtual
absence of proof on causation," it was appropriate to
consider "alternate methods of distributing [the] settlement
fund [that] may be premised on a rationale similar to the cy
pres doctrine of testamentary interpretation."9"
The apparent inconsistency in the court's decision was created by
the court leaving the lump sum award intact while emphasizing the
equitable nature of the award. This inconsistency is justified by the court's
concern that disturbing the award would only cause administrative
inconvenience and would not result in any appreciable benefit in this
particular case. Thus, the court announced that the rule requiring a
court-supervised fund would apply prospectively.98 The Ayers decision
and its remedy suggest that either medical monitoring costs were once
legal damages but are now available only as equitable remedies, or that
these costs may be legal or equitable remedies depending on the
circumstances.99
93. Id. at 315. Because the parties first addressed the issue of creating a fund to pay
these expenses was raised for the first time on appeal, the court would have had to reopen
the entire question of damages for each plaintiff in order to separate out the portion to be
allocated to medical monitoring. ML at 313, 315.
94. Id. at 314.
95. 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 194 (2d
Cir. 1987).
96. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314 (quoting In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1402-03)
(alteration in original).
97. Id. at 315.
98. Id.
99. The latter conclusion is contrary to the general rule that equitable remedies are only
available when legal remedies are inadequate.
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The key assumption that underlies the New Jersey Supreme Court's
opinion in Ayers is that the increased risk of harm is in fact an injury. ' ®
Because of the difficulty in proving the extent of such an injury, however,
the plaintiff has only a limited right to recover damages for that harm.'0'
Courts are unable to accurately measure and evaluate such injuries, and
thus are reluctant to award compensation."
In contrast, courts can ascertain the approximate costs of medical
screening, monitoring, and surveillance necessary to detect symptoms or
signs of disease.0 3 Though not without its uncertainties, such as
changing medical technology and discounting to present value, medical
monitoring is a more certain remedy than a remedy which tries to
determine if the exposed individual will actually develop the disease, or
what a given individual's probability of developing the disease is.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey revisited the issue of medical
monitoring in Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc. " In Mauro the court
affirmed an award of a lump sum payment of medical monitoring costs to
a single plaintiff."5 When taken in conjunction with Ayers, this award
indicates that the court viewed medical monitoring as a legal remedy that
may possess equitable features in a mass tort situation. The court relied
on Ayers, and its decision clarified that the analysis of the court in Ayers
was not limited to cases under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.'"
100. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 822-23 (Cal. 1993); see
also Mauro v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989) (clarifying that Ayers held
that enhanced risk itself is not compensable but medical monitoring based on enhanced
risk is).
101. See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 305-07 (citing conflicting court opinions).
102. See id. at 307; Mauro, 561 A.2d at 262-63.
103. The reason for the use of a court-supervised fund is the fact that cost can only be
determined in rough terms. If cost could be determined with certainty, no reason would
exist not to award a lump sum, a more simple remedy for all concerned.
104. 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989).
105. Id. at 260-67.
106. Id.; see also Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (federal
circuit court interpreting New Jersey law and treating medical monitoring as a
compensable element of tort damages rather than as equitable relief).
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B. The Debate Over the Present Injury Requirement
While the New Jersey courts were wrestling with medical
monitoring costs in Ayers," 7 a Pennsylvania trial court addressed the
same issue in Habitants Against Landfill Toxicants (HALT) v. City of
York. 8 The plaintiffs in HALT were property owners whose wells were
contaminated with toxic substances from a landfill operated by the city of
York and other defendants. In addition to separate actions at law for
damages, the plaintiffs filed an equity action seeking a million-dollar
medical monitoring fund, an alternative water supply, and other relief."l
The defendants filed for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiffs had
an adequate remedy at law and arguing that Pennsylvania did not recognize
an equitable action for medical monitoring."' The court denied the
defendants' motion. Citing the trial court's ruling in Ayers, the court
found that Pennsylvania recognized an action seeking a constructive trust
to pay medical monitoring expenses."'
In Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.12 the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania relied on HALT in denying
the defendant's motion for summary judgment."' Property owners
whose wells were contaminated by toxic substances, including toulene and
xylene,"4 claimed that exposure to these substances had resulted in
emotional distress, fear of future injury and disease, and increased risk of
107. See supra notes 77-102 and accompanying text.
108. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,937 (Pa. Ct. C.P. May 20, 1985). HALT was
decided before the New Jersey Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in
Ayers.
109. Id at 20,937.
110. Id at 20,938.
111. Id. at 20,938-39 (citing Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 461 A.2d 184 (N.J. Super.
1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 525 A.2d 287 (NJ. 1987)).
112. 684 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
113. Id at 849.
114. Id at 851. Toluene is a volatile hydrocarbon (C6H5CH3) that smells like benzene.
Many chemical and industrial processes use toluene as a solvent feedstock, and it is also
used as an additive. Xylene is also a volatile hydrocarbon(C 6H4(CH3)2) that is a
commercial mixture of three isomers (ortho-, meta-, and para-xylene). Companies use
xylene as an additive in gasoline, as a solvent in protective coatings and resins, and as a
part of the production process for organic chemicals. GESSNER G. HAWLEY, THE
CONDENSED CHEMICAL DICrIONARY 1031, 1100 (10th ed. 1981).
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cancer and other diseases."1 5 The plaintiffs also requested future medical
monitoring expenses and other damages."6
The court held that in order to recover medical monitoring
damages, the plaintiffs needed to prove (1) exposure to a hazardous
substance because of the defendant's actions, (2) potential for injury, and
(3) the need for early detection and treatment." 7
Applying a slightly different standard, the federal district court for
eastern Pennsylvania in Villari v. Terminix Int'l Inc."' had held one year
earlier that Pennsylvania law required a plaintiff seeking medical
monitoring costs to show some present injury, although not necessarily the
symptoms of the disease to be monitored."9  In Merry the court
specifically rejected this standard."n
In 1990 the third circuit court of appeals resolved the conflict as to
which standard was appropriate under Pennsylvania law for determining
whether to award medical monitoring expenses. In In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig.,' the third circuit found that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would probably recognize a claim for medical monitoring." The
court set forth the following standard:
1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven
hazardous substance through the negligent actions of the
defendant.
2. As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a
significantly increased risk of contacting a serious latent
disease.
3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic
examinations reasonably necessary.
115. Merry, 648 F. Supp. at 848.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 850.
118. 663 F. Supp 727, amended, 677 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
119. Id. at 735.
120. Merry, 684 F. Supp. at 848-49.
121. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 499
U.S. 961 (1991).
122. Id. at 852.
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4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make
early detection and treatment of the disease possible and
beneficial."
The present injury requirement adopted by the district court in Villari was
specifically rejected."M The third circuit cited the Ayers decision with
approval, including the requirement that "competent expert testimony"
must support the plaintiff's claim for medical monitoring." The court
did caution plaintiffs, stating that
[i]n light of the statute of limitations problems caused by
Pennsylvania law against splitting causes of action, we
intimate no view as to whether a plaintiff who sues for
medical monitoring must forego his or her claim for
damages if and when the disease ultimately manifests
itself.
Courts in other states have followed the medical monitoring
decisions of the New Jersey and Pennsylvania courts. For example, state
courts in New York, 7 Arizona," and Indiana 129 have recognized the
right to recover medical monitoring expenses without showing present
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id at 852 (citing Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (NJ. 1987)).
126. Id. at 852 n.25a.
127. See, e.g., Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (holding that medical monitoring damages may be recovered on an individual
basis); Geradi v. Nuclear Util. Servs., 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)
(allowing medical monitoring damages "which may flow from the invasion of the body
by toxic substances through negligent exposure").
128. See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp, 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), petition
for review dismissed, 781 P.2d 1373 (1987). Citing Ayers, the court held that despite the
lack of evidence of any present physical harm, the plaintiffs were entitled to regular
medical testing "as [was] reasonably necessary and consistent with contemporary scientific
principles applies by physicians experienced in the diagnosis and treatment of these types
of injuries." Id. at 33. But see Destories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705, 711 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claim as factually insufficient
due to the failure of the plaintiffs to prove that the proposed expenses were "reasonably
necessary").
129. See, e.g., Adams v. Clean Air Sys., 586 N.E.2d 940 (Ind. CL App. 1992).
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injury. Federal district courts in Minnesota 3 and Hawaii' have
recognized a similar cause of action.
In Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 32 the district court
expanded the remedies allowed in the New Jersey and Pennsylvania cases.
A worker at a Firestone plant, one of the plaintiffs in Barth, filed a suit
seeking class certification on behalf of himself and other employees
allegedly exposed to benzene, heavy metals, and other industrial toxins
used or produced in the tire-making process.33 The plaintiffs contended
that their class was entitled to equitable relief in the form of a fund
designed to locate exposed employees and former employees, and then to
pool and share the knowledge about the results of the alleged
exposures.'3 a This fund would also provide diagnosis and preventative
medical care to minimize the extent of any future harms. 35 The
plaintiffs alleged that as class members, they would suffer irreparable harm
such as misdiagnosis, mistreatment, and loss of legal rights stemming from
the failure to recognize symptoms if the fund was not established. 36 The
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss this claim.' 37 It held that
the plaintiffs need not prove any present physical injury or impairment to
claim this remedy.' 31
The Barth case also illuminates the interplay between the present
injury requirement and worker's compensation laws. For the plaintiffs in
130. See, e.g., Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated on
other grounds, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992) (denying medical monitoring under
CERCLA and RCRA, but allowing it as a common law tort remedy).
131. See, e.g., In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Haw. 1990).
For other federal cases discussing the medical monitoring cause of action, see Hagerty v.
L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co., 645
F. Supp. 764 (W.D. La. 1986).
132. 661 F. Supp. 193, revised, 673 F. Supp 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
133. Id. at 195, 203-05.
134. Id. at 194-96.
135. id.
136. Id. at 203.
137. Id. at 205.
138. Cf. id. at 196. Although the court did not require the plaintiff to allege a current
manifestation of cancer to defeat defendant's summary judgment motion, the court found
that the plaintiff "suffered a direct injury to his immune system and a further injury
through the presence of diseases in their latency period." Id.
The Supreme Court of California has approved the lack of a requirement of a
present injury, even in an action at law. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863
P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
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Barth, their only hope of recovery was to show no present injury or
impairment. If the plaintiffs had alleged that they suffered present harm
or injury, the action would be barred by the exclusivity provision of
California's workers' compensation law. 39
Although many courts have allowed claims for medical monitoring
expenses, others have denied these claims or allowed them only with proof
of present injury."4 Requiring proof of present injury is the functional
equivalent of denying the claim for medical monitoring expenses for toxic
torts because the plaintiff is forced to prove the existence of the injury and
the cause of the injury before the injury even exists.
C. The Desirability of Medical Monitoring Damages
The idea that a person who has exposed another person to a
hazardous substance, which increases the risk that the exposed person may
contract a serious disease, should be required to pay for medical testing to
protect the victim's health is an extremely appealing idea in an emotional
sense.' 4' Medical monitoring seems to present all benefit and no
detriment, except the detriment suffered by a company accused of creating
the danger. Medical monitoring is not entirely benign in effect, however,
and both courts and commentators have placed limits on the doctrine.
The American Law Institute's project ("ALL Study" or "Study")
examining responsibility for personal injuries42 endorses limited medical
monitoring.'43 Initially, the ALI Study would require that the need for
monitoring be established by "reliable expert testimony" provided by
"court appointed experts or science panels.""IM As a further limitation,
139. See Barth, 661 F. Supp. at 198-200.
140. See, e.g., Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 876 (1992) (denying claim under West Virginia and Virginia law without proof
of present physical injury).
141. See Leslie S. Gara, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using Common Sense and
the Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 269-70 (1988); Parnell et al., supra note 16, at 6.
142. 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
378-79 (1991).
143. Id. at i.
144. Id at 379-80. The ALI Study is favorably inclined towards both court-appointed
experts and the use of special panels of scientific and technical experts to deal with the
problem of "hired gun" experts and the perceived difficulty that courts have in dealing
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the ALI Study recommends an offset for items already covered by a
collateral source such as insurance.
45
The Study does not advocate damages for medical monitoring that
fall within the scope of normal periodic medical examinations or that are
recommended by fringe "clinical ecologists."" 6 Instead, the ALI Study
recommends
some sort of epidemiological investigation of where and
when the disease actually manifests itself among the
exposed groups. This work would serve both to inform the
medical profession about which people are in real need of
early treatment and to provide reassurance to people who
turn out not to be at risk. 147
The Study adds, "We do not favor awarding damages under the label of
'medical monitoring' and having the money paid directly to the plaintiffs
to be spent on additional medical attention only if they are so
inclined."' 48
Medical monitoring as proposed by the ALI Study is appealing if
courts impose the remedy based on a modified negligence theory with the
requirements of injury and causation deleted. The requirements of duty
and breach would continue to provide some degree of protection to a
defendant who acted as reasonably as possible at the time of his actions,
but who now finds his past decisions being criticized from the perspective
of current knowledge. 49
with scientific and technical questions. This view is shared by many other critics of the
current liability system. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 29; Troyen A. Brennan, Helping
Courts with Toxic Torts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1989); Jack B. Weinstien, Improving
Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 (1986).
145. 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 142, at i.
146. See, e.g., American Academy of Allergy & Immunology, Position Statement:
Clinical Ecology, 78 J. OF ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 269 (1986); Abba I. Terr,
Environmental Illness: A Clinical Review of Fifty Cases, 146 ARCH. OF INTERN. MED. 145
(Jan. 1986).
147. 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 142.
148. Id. at 379.
149. See John E. Munter & Scott P. DeVries, Higgins v. Aerojet Corporation:
Successfully Defending A Toxic Tort Case, I Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 874
(1987). In Higgins a jury accepted the argument that the defendant Aerojet should not
have their conduct in the mid 1950's judged by the standards of the mid 1970's. Id.
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Medical monitoring, despite its benign image, presents problems in
application, even in situations in which a court imposes a trust to insure
that the money intended for medical monitoring is indeed spent for that
purpose as opposed to funding additional litigation 5' or a trip to Las
Vegas.'5' For example, medical monitoring without the requirement of
present injury forces courts to make decisions based on limited scientific
knowledge. The requirement of actual physical injury acts as a floor for
imposing liability and provides at least one clear reference point that does
not require a Ph.D. in biostatistics to understand.
The further the rules of liability move from their common law
roots, the more each side is forced to rely upon experts. As this
movement occurs, the process is reduced to a battle of experts. Yet, the
judicial system relies on a panel of non-experts in a jury trial or a single
non-expert in a judge trial to determine the outcome." This problem is
partially relieved by the use of court-appointed experts and/or science
panels as recommended by the ALI Study."' These devices, however,
will increase the cost and complexity of the already costly and complex
process of toxic tort litigation.
Another problem with medical monitoring is that courts cannot
always easily determine the specifics of the medical monitoring remedy.
The testing protocol should not be a replacement for regular health
care." Additionally, testing should be geared both to the chemicals
involved and to their amounts. For example, a protocol designed for an
occupational setting, in which the levels of exposure are much higher than
in the typical toxic tort case, would not necessarily be appropriate in
screening the plaintiffs in a typical groundwater contamination case. The
150. See Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 820
(D.C. Cir. 1984). Early in this long and convoluted case, a partial settlement occurred in
which Lockheed paid $5000 per plaintiff for the infant plaintiffs' "medical treatment" and
"therapy," or for their litigation expenses. Id. All of the money was used for litigation
expenses, on the assumption that the cases would settle after the bellwether trials. When
this settlement did not occur, the issue of funding for medical monitoring had to be
revisited. I&
151. 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 142, at 379.
152. See David Bernstein, Note, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The Expert
Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REv. LITIG. 117, 123-24 (1990) (discussing
jury incompetence in toxic tort cases).
153. 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 142.
154. Ronald E. Gots, Medical Monitoring Following Chemical Exposures, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Nov. 1992, at 22, 24.
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protocol would be inadequate because the levels of exposure are normally
much lower when the route of exposure is groundwater.'55
If sufficient money and time are expended on testing, a physician
can almost always find something abnormal; often what he finds will only
prove that the test result is indeed outside the normal range.'56 Before
medical monitoring can be a practical benefit to the plaintiff,'57 proof
must exist that the condition for which he is being monitored is one whose
treatment or cure depends upon early detection.' A test that provides
reliable early detection must also exist.'59
In addition, the adverse effects of screening need to be considered.
These effects include both the risk of false positives"6 and labeling.''
False negative tests, which will give an unwarranted sense of security, are
also possible. To the extent that a testing protocol is not well-designed
and scientifically valid, these risks increase. 62
Another problem with medical monitoring claims is that their
prosecution and defense are extremely fact-specific. Even in those
jurisdictions that recognize medical monitoring as a valid cause of action,
the plaintiff's attorney must lay all of the necessary foundations to avoid
a defense verdict.63 Similarly, even in jurisdictions such as Virginia or
155. See generally CASSARETr & DOULL, TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF
POISONS.
156. Steven H. Woolf & Douglas B. Kamerow, Testing for Uncommon Conditions: The
Heroic Search for Positive Test Results, 150 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 150 (1990).
157. For example, a practical benefit would be a health benefit to the exposed plaintiff,
as opposed to a general gain in society's scope of knowledge about the effects of
substance X.
158. Gots, supra note 154, at 25.
159. Id.
160. False positives are results that suggest an abnormality when in fact nothing is
wrong.
161. Labeling occurs when an individual is perceived by himself and others as "damaged
goods."
162. See William Feldman, How Serious are the Adverse Effects of Screening?, 5 J. OF
GEN. INTERN. MED. S50 (Oct. 1990 Supp.); Terr, supra note 146.
163. See, e.g., Destories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). In
Destories the court rejected the plaintiff's medical monitoring claim as factually
insufficient due to the plaintiff's failure to prove the proposed expenses were "reasonably
necessary." Id. at 711; see also Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.
1986).
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West Virginia"6 that have refused to recognize medical monitoring as
distinct from future medical expenses, the defendant's counsel will have
to argue against a broad definition of injury that includes "subcellular" or
"subclinical" injury. 65 Medical monitoring claims reward the attorney
who is well-prepared on both the law and the scienc&, regardless of
whether he represents the plaintiff"6  or defendant. 67  A poorly
prepared case claiming toxic injury and medical monitoring is unlikely to
survive a motion for dismissal or summary judgment.6
III. ALTERNATIVE THEORY TWO: EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
Emotional distress as an alternative damage theory allows recovery
for injuries other than physical ones. Emotional distress damage claims
may also include the traditional claim for pain and suffering, as these are
injuries in the intangible and emotional sense.69  Most lawyers,
commentators, and judges generally view emotional distress as the distress
that is fundamentally separate and distinct from a physical injury.
164. See, e.g., Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc. 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 876 (1992). In Ball the court held that a "claim for medical surveillance costs
is simply a claim for future damages." Id. at 39.
165. See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986);
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984).
166. See, e.g., Elam v. Alcolac Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
817 (1989). In Elam the court awarded a $49 million verdict, including $43 million in
punitive damages on numerous grounds, one of which was medical monitoring. Id. at 49.
The parties settled for $6 million.
167. See, e.g., Munter & DeVries, supra note 149; Clifford J. Zatz & Jeffery K.
Sherwood, Defending Speculative Injury Claims, 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 76
(1987); see also Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D. Mich.
1987).
168. See, e.g., Carroll v. Litton Systems Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969
(W.D.N.C. Oct 29, 1990); see also Stites, 660 F. Supp. 1516.
169. See Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Stables, 62 Ill. 313, 320-21 (1872).
1994]
WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol.18:285
Infliction of emotional distress has two principal forms, negligent
and intentional. 70 Negligent infliction of emotional distress can be either
an independent tort'' or an element of damages in negligence cases.'
A. Background on Emotional Distress Damages
Courts have traditionally recognized that a person injured because
of the negligent or wrongful actions of another can recover not only for his
financial losses, but also for the pain, suffering, and inconvenience caused
by the defendant's actions.' The development of an action or element
of damages to compensate the plaintiff for fear of injuries that he has not
yet suffered, however, is a more recent development.'74
In toxic tort cases, the specific question is whether the plaintiff can
recover for the fear or apprehension caused by his awareness of his
exposure to a hazardous substance.' This question assumes that the
particular substance has the capability of causing harm to the plaintiff.
Though many of the cases have dealt with fear of cancer, the question
extends to any future harm, such as immune system dysfunctions or other
diseases, that results from exposure to hazardous substances and has a long
latency period. 7"
170. See Charlton v. Day Island Marina, Inc., 732 P.2d 1008, 1013 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987). This Article is primarily concerned with the negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is far more dependent
on individual state law determinations and raises issues of both fraud and punitive
damages that are beyond the scope of this Article.
171. See George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1991).
172. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 863 P.2d 795, 805 (Cal. 1993); Marlene
F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278, 281 (Cal. 1989).
173. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 545 (1973).
174. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A
Solution or a Pandora's Box, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 527 (1984).
175. See generally PAUL R. LEES-HALEY, DEFENSE OF DAMAGES IN MASS INJURY
CLAIMS (1992) (commercial monograph, on file with Paul R. Lees-Haley, Ph.D., A
Psychological Corporation, Encino, Cal.).
176. See, e.g., Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991)
(suing for fear of AIDS from being bitten by hospital patient suffering from AIDS);
Stephanie B. Goldberg, Aids Phobia: Reasonable Fears or Unreasonable Lawsuits?,
ABA JOURNAL, June 1992, at 88.
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B. The Requirement of Reasonable Fear
Almost everyone is concerned about the risk of cancer.'" The
average person is aware of the risk of cancer, but tends not to brood about
it too much. When an average person is told he has been exposed to a
hazardous substance which may increase his risk of cancer, however, the
amount of worry and concern he experiences may increase
dramatically.17 This concern is reasonable and perhaps even beneficial
because it may lead him to seek information about his condition and
reduce other risk factors."' In comparison, other individuals may have
a nervous disposition or may, at the mention of "the dread specter of
cancer,' ' 80 become completely disabled solely because of emotional
reasons.
The states are divided as to whether the traditional "eggshell-thin
skull"'' rule applies in emotional distress cases. This problem of
whether to apply the rule arises in cases in which some basis for the fear
exists, but that basis lasts only a short time. 2 The general rule is that
the plaintiff is entitled to recover only for the distress that occurs while a
177. See Color Additives: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 115-18 (1960) (statement of Rep. Harris) (noting that
"almost everyone ... is so conscious of cancer as a dread disease" and hypothesizing that
throwing out the Delaney Clause "would create so much fear in the mind of the American
people" that they might react against industry); see also DORE, supra note 18, at §
7.02[3]; Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, SCIENCE, April 1987, at 280.
178. See Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Loses:
Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 253 (1977); Paul Slovic, Judgement,
Choice and Societal Risk Taking, in JUDGEMENT AND DECISION IN PUBLIC POLICY
FORMATION 98, 99 (Kenneth Hammond ed., 1980).
179. For example, both smoking and exposure to asbestos increase the chance of lung
cancer occurring in a given individual. The increase from a combination of asbestos
exposure and smoking, however, is dramatically more than that from either alone.
HUBER, supra note 29, at 154.
180. See Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1986).
181. The term "eggshell skull" comes from illustrations appearing in English cases in
which a plaintiff with an "eggshell skull" suffers death as a result of a defendant's
negligence when a normal person would only suffer a bump on the head. See Dulieu v.
White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 679 (1901); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 43,
at 292.
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 312, 313 (1991). The answer is different
for intentional infliction of emotional distress than for negligent infliction. If one intends
their actions to cause emotional distress to another, and the target is injured by those
actions, the actor is liable even if the harm is far more severe than desired or intended.
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reasonable basis for his fear continues.' This line of reasoning
developed out of dog bite cases in which the operative fear was the fear
of rabies.'84 One bitten by an unknown dog is reasonable in fearing
rabies; one bitten by an apparently mad dog is even more reasonable in
suffering from the fear of rabies. This fear is reasonable, however, only
for the time that rabies has the potential to appear after a bite.'85 Beyond
that period, the general rule is that claims for damages from fear and
emotional distress are unreasonable and noncompensable.'86
Two recent cases have addressed the issue of placing a time
limitation on the reasonableness of the fear of disease. In a traditional
toxic tort case, Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.,'87 the plaintiffs
alleged that Orkin had contaminated their water supply with a hazardous
chemical while treating their home for termites.' Upon discovering the
contamination, the plaintiffs installed a new water system and sought
medical care.'89 After the installation of the new water system, the
plaintiffs' doctor told them that they needed no further tests."9
The plaintiffs sued and asked for damages for emotional distress
based on the fear of future disease.'' The court found that the plaintiffs
were reasonable in being concerned and fearful about the future effects of
the contamination. 92 The court determined, however, that the
reasonableness of the plaintiffs' fear ended when their physician told them
that their blood test levels were normal, and that they would experience no
further effects from the exposure. 93
183. For cases applying the general rule, see, e.g., Clark v. United States, 660 F. Supp.
1164 (W.D. Wash. 1987), aff'd, 856 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1988); Laxton v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
184. See Dworkin, supra note 174, at 542.
185. This time period is approximately one year for rabies. See MERCK MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 183 (Robert Berkow ed., 15th ed. 1991).
186. See, e.g., Buck v. Brady, 73 A. 277 (Md. 1909); Friedman v. McGowan, 42 A. 723
(Del. 1898); Serio v. American Brewing Co., 74 So. 290 (La. 1917).
187. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
188. Id. at 432.
189. Id. at 432-33.
190. Id. at 433.
191. Id. at 431.
192. Id. at 434.
193. Id.
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In the second case, Johnson v. West Virginia University
Hospitals,'" a patient infected with the AIDS virus bit a security
officer.'95 The court awarded the plaintiff $1.9 million in emotional
distress damages because of his "reasonable fear of contacting AIDS.'
96
The jury and the appellate court ignored facts in the record that cast great
doubt on the reasonableness of both the fear and the verdict." First,
according to the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), no documented
cases existed in which AIDS was transmitted through biting or saliva.
Additionally, according to a CDC report, ninety-five percent of those
people exposed to HIV will seroconvert98 within six months of exposure,
and rarely does anyone seroconvert after a year.'"
The apparent inconsistency between the results in Laxton and
Johnson can be explained by the fact that society's knowledge of AIDS
and HIV transmission is still developing and is less complete than the
knowledge of more conventional diseases.' ° This explanation indicates
courts' willingness to allow the fears and fads of the general populace to
create liability without regard for any basis in science.2"'
The different results in Laxton and Johnson emphasize the key
weakness of the limitation of recovery for emotional distress due to fear
of disease to those fears that are "reasonable." The weakness is that what
is "reasonable" is not defined, and may not even be subject to precise
definition. Is a fear based on a widely-held, but patently untrue
assumption, reasonable? Does the fear cease to be reasonable when the
plaintiff is informed of the true facts, or would a reasonable man still
follow superstition and folk wisdom and disregard scientific knowledge?
Some courts have allowed recovery for fears that were irrational but
widely-held.' Other courts have refused to allow recovery on similar
194. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
195. Id at 891.
196. Goldberg, supra note 176, at 88.
197. Id
198. One seroconverts when one develops antibodies to a virus. The standard tests for
the AIDS virus do not test for the virus itself, but instead test for the antibodies the body
makes in response to the presence of the virus. See Goldberg, supra note 176, at 88. See
also Martha F. Rogers et al., Lack of Transmission of Human Immunodeficeny Virus From
Infected Children to Their Household Contacts, 85 PEDIATRICS 210 (1990).
199. Goldberg, supra note 176, at 88.
200. l
201. See HUBER, supra note 29, at 130-47.
202. See, e.g., Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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facts.2"3 The general rule is that a plaintiff can recover for fear of future
disease only if that fear is "reasonable."2" The reality, however, is that
reasonableness is a question of fact. In most cases a jury can disregard
science in deciding if a fear is reasonable, and the appellate courts are
bound to uphold the verdict.2 5
C. Floors and Hurdles in Emotional Distress Litigation
Claims for emotional distress are inherently subjective because the
injury cannot be seen. This invisibility causes two interrelated concerns
for courts. The first concern is that a flood of new claims will occur,2
and the second concern is that many of these claims will be false.'3
Courts have utilized various approaches in addressing these concerns.
These approaches can be divided into two categories, "floors" and
"hurdles."
The floors category incorporates the idea that certain things are too
inconsequential to be compensable. "[S]ome level of harm [exists] which
one should absorb without recompense as the price he pays for living in
an organized society.""2 8 The most common floor used by courts is a
requirement that the emotional distress be "serious." This requirement
insures that the harm is important enough to make it worthwhile to invest
the court's time in determining if an injury exists and the amount of
compensation required. 9
Hurdles are particular requirements of proof a plaintiff must meet
before the finder of fact can consider the claim.2t Judges are generally
203. See, e.g., Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 52 S.E. 152 (Ga. 1905); Burk v. Sage
Prods. Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (1990).
204. See In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Me. 1986).
205. See, e.g., Johnson, 413 S.E.2d 889; see also Richard S. Brown & Paul R.
Lees-Haley, Fear of Future Illness, Chemical AIDS and Cancerphobia: A Review, 71
PSYCHOL. REP. 187, 197 (1992).
206. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896).
207. See Payton v. Abott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
208. Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
209. See Dworkin, supra note 174, at 530; Deleski v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 819 F.2d 377,
380 (3d Cir. 1987); see also William H. Armstrong, Tort Damages for Personal Injuries
Not Yet Suffered, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 26, 54 (1988).
210. Some floors, such as a requirement of physical injury before emotional distress can
be awarded, are also hurdles.
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suspicious of claims for emotional distress, particularly in toxic tort cases.
Thus, courts have traditionally denied recovery in cases in which no direct
physical impact or injury has occurred.2" ' For example, courts often
require that the plaintiff have a physical injury before it will entertain a
claim for emotional distress, including the fear of future diseases.22 The
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action has its own
built-in hurdles because the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted
with the intention of causing the plaintiff emotional distress. Because of
this inherent hurdle, the physical injury requirement does not usually apply
to claims for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.213
The requirement that the plaintiff show present physical harm is a
real and fairly serious hurdle." 4 Many courts have denied recovery to
plaintiffs who could not show sufficient physical harm.25 Assuming that
the plaintiff must establish present "physical harm" as a threshold for being
able to recover damages for the fear of future disease, how severe must
that harm be?216 Some courts require only "impact," '217 and other courts
require injury. 21
In most jurisdictions that follow the impact rule, merely ingesting
a hazardous substance will not be enough to support a claim for emotional
211. See generally ARVIN MASKIN, OVERVIEW AND UPDATE OF EMERGING DAMAGE
THEORIES IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION (ALI-ABA, 1991); Fournier J. Gale & James L.
Goyer, II, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CUMB. L. REV.
723 (1985).
212. See, e.g., Ruth v. Fletcher, 377 S.E.2d 412 (Va. 1989).
213. See, e.g., Moore v. Allied Chem. Corp., 480 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Va. 1979); Sypert
v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1983) (applying Virginia law and holding that
physical injury is not a requirement if the defendant's actions were willful, wanton and
vindictive); Linker v. Custom-Bilt Machinery, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1991).
214. See, e.g., Amendola v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 699 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo.
1988); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987); Woyke v.
Tonka Corp., 420 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
215. See, e.g., Nesom v. Tri Hawk Int'l, 985 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1993).
216. See, e.g., Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1526 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (requiring that the plaintiffs show that their alleged ingestion of contaminated
water had caused "definite and objective physical injury"). The court in Stites noted that
Michigan courts have been "very lenient in finding allegations [of physical] harm
sufficient." Id. at 1527 (quoting Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 909,
917 (W.D. Mich. 1983)).
217. See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 225-34 and accompanying text.
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distress from fear of future harm without evidence that some change to the
body resulted from contact with the hazardous substance.2"9 However,
the plaintiff must prove only that the change occurred, and not that the
change was harmful.22° A minority of courts will not even demand a
showing of physical change. In Wetherill v. University of Chicago,22'
mere prenatal exposure to DES satisfied the impact requirement.'
Some courts have developed variations on this analysis. For
example, in Bennett v. Mallinckrodt223 the court required that the
plaintiffs show emotional "distress [that] is medically diagnosable and
medically significant." The court did not require the plaintiffs to show
"contemporaneous physical injury. '224
The injury test has many different manifestations. In its most
lenient form, courts have purported to require physical injury, but have
then accepted proof of such slight injuries that they have in fact adopted
an "impact" test. For example, in Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp.2z the
court allowed an emotional distress claim to go to the jury based on
evidence of subcellular harm alone.226 In Herber v. Johns-Manville
219. See, e.g., McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(requiring present bodily injury for recovery of fear of future cancer in a DES case);
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986) (requiring physical
harm and requiring that although it need not be immediately apparent, its existence must
be evidenced by expert medical testimony).
220. See Plummer v. Unites States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that exposure to
the tubercle bacteria, as shown by a change from a negative to a positive skin test, was
sufficient to support a claim for emotional distress).
221. 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Il. 1983).
222. Id. at 1562. DES is an abbreviation for Diethylstilbestrol, or diethyl stilbestrol, a
synthetic estrogen that duplicates the actions of natural estrogens. DES is used for
estrogen replacement therapy, but was formerly used to prevent miscarriage in pregnancy.
DES is no longer used for the latter purpose due to the possibility that its use caused
cancer in the reproductive organs of the children born of these pregnancies. NEW
AMERICAN POCKET MEDICAL DICrIONARY (1978). But see McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
638 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
223. 698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986).
224. Id. at 866-67.
225. 586 F. Supp 14 (C.D. Colo. 1984) (alleging the defendants had contaminated the
plaintiffs home with radioactive residue); see also Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 638
F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986) (requiring that the alleged subcellular harm be proven by
expert medical testimony based on objective evidence).
226. Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 18.
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Corp.,'7 the plaintiff feared contracting asbestosis and presented
evidence of "pleural thickening.""22 Although asbestos exposure is only
one possible cause of pleural thickening, the court permitted the plaintiff
to recover without evidence of asbestosis or other impairment. 3°
On the other hand, some courts have developed variations of the
injury test that greatly increase the hurdle. In Rabb v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., Inc., 1 the court required the plaintiffs to prove with reasonable
certainty that the feared future condition would occur, in addition to
showing a present bodily injury.232 Because the plaintiffs did not offer
any proof of the specific disease that they feared, the court found that the
plaintiffs had not laid an adequate foundation for the recovery of emotional
distress for the threat of future harm.
233
Other courts have distinguished between "ordinary fear," which can
be shown by lay witnesses, and "cancerphobia," which requires expert
testimony.' Some courts have even allowed recovery without proof of
present physical injury or impact. These courts have allowed recovery
with proof of exposure without any significant physical changes as
227. 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986).
228. Pleural thickening involves a scarring of the pleura or lining of the lung. Pleural
thickening "is highly suggestive of asbestos exposure when other possible causes, such
as trauma, surgery, and infection, are excluded." See AMA Council on Scientific Affairs,
A Physician's Guide to Asbestos-Related Diseases, 252 JAMA 2593, 2593 (1984).
"Patients with only pleural involvement are usually asymptomatic and have normal
pulmonary function," although patients with extensive pleural thickening may have
difficulty breathing. CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 2363 (1988).
229. Asbestosis is fibrosis of the lungs resulting from the inhalation of fine asbestos dust
and fibers. NEW AMERICAN POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY (1978).
230. Herber, 785 F.2d at 82-83.
231. 677 F. Supp. 424 (D.S.C. 1987). But see Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc.,
660 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (denying summary judgment for the defendant
despite the fact that the plaintiffs did not state their fears in definite and concrete terms).
232. Rabb, 677 F. Supp. at 428.
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. 1985);
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 492
So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1986). Plaintiffs can also recover damages for present psychiatric
injuries independently from damages for the emotional distress from the fear of future
disease or injury. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 804 (Cal.
1993).
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evidence.235 These courts draw the line, however, at the point of definite
exposure. Courts have rejected all cases that have sought recovery for the
fear of future disease based solely upon possible exposure.236
Another approach to limiting the plaintiffs right to recover for
allegations of fear of future harm requires the plaintiff to show he is more
likely than not to contract the disease.237 Courts use this particular
hurdle more in the litigation of enhanced risk claims,238 but occasionally
utilize it in claims for fear of disease.239
D. Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages by Bystanders
Recovery by a bystander for emotional distress is a claim that
courts in tort cases have traditionally treated with disfavor.' Most
courts that have considered the issue have rejected claims for bystander
recovery of emotional distress in toxic tort cases. For example, in
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp.,24 the court denied recovery to the
survivors of asbestos workers for the emotional distress caused by the
"observation of gradual, nontraumatic injury to family members."242 The
235. See In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634 (D. Me. 1986); Hagerty v. L & L Marine
Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, reconsideration denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986).
236. See, e.g., Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984)
(rejecting the claim of an asbestos worker's wife who was exposed to asbestos from
washing her husband's clothes); Rittenhouse v. St. Regis Hotel Joint Venture, 579
N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (dismissing the claim of an interior decorator who
attempted to claim for the fear of future disease based on a possible exposure); Cathcart
v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (rejecting the claim of a
wife who ingested asbestos fibers while washing her husband's clothes because she had
no physical manifestations of disease and finding that Pennsylvania law requires some
physical injury for recovery).
237. See, e.g., Watson v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 507 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987); Daniels v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 583 S.W.2d 768 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); Elam
v. Alcolac Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989).
238. See infra part IV.
239. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 756 P.2d 740 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988);
Clark v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. Wash. 1987), affd, 856 F.2d 1433 (9th
Cir. 1988); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985).
240. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 54, at 366.
241. 812 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987).
242. Id. at 90.
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court in Anderson v. W.R. Grace and Co."3 also denied recovery to the
plaintiffs who witnessed the negligently-induced illness of family
members.'
E. Emotional Distress Damages in Perspective
Damages for emotional distress from the fear of future disease
contrast in important ways from medical monitoring and recovery purely
for increased risk. Emotional distress claims offer the possibility of
substantial damages,24 because unlike medical monitoring they are not
limited to the amount of expected future medical testing costs.
Furthermore, these damages are not subject to defense motions requesting
the court to use its equitable powers to establish a trust fund instead
paying the plaintiff in a lump sum.' 6 Unlike claims for compensation
for enhanced risk of future disease, emotional distress actions usually lack
a causation hurdle. 7
IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORY THREE: DAMAGES FOR ENHANCED RISK OF
FuTuRE DISEASE
The concept of a claim for increased or enhanced risk of disease,
though mostly disfavored by the courts,' dates to 1930.9 The
243. 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
244. ld. at 1230. But see Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431
(Tenn. 1982) (finding sufficient injury to the plaintiffs to allow recovery of damages for
their concern about themselves and their infant children).
245. Robert L. Willmore, In Fear of Cancerphobia, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at
559, 561 (Sept. 28, 1988).
246. Tort reform statutes of general application in some states will limit the plaintiff's
recovery for non-economic damages and may in some cases require periodic payment of
damages. See generally 2 DAVID LOUISELL & HENRY WILLIAMS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ch. 18 (1993).
247. See Willmore, supra note 245, at 562.
248. See, e.g., Schweitzer v. Cofisol. Rail Corp. (Conrail), 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied sub nom. Reading Co. v. Schweitzer, 474 U.S. 864 (1985) (holding
that "until injury manifests itself, it follows that there [is] no legal relationship between
plaintiffs and defendants relevant to plaintiff's future causes of action in tort from which
an 'interest' could flow"); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D.
Ill. 1978) (holding that risk of cancer alone without manifestation of physical injury is
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elements of the cause of action for enhanced risk of disease consist of the
traditional tort elements--duty, breach, injury, and causation--with a
definition of injury that considers a present risk of future injury as the
equivalent of present injury."'
Some courts have allowed an increased risk claim only if present
injury exists.25' This position is a halfway point between recognizing
future consequences of present injuries, a well-recognized, if sometimes
factually suspect, form of personal injury damages,252 and allowing
recovery for the increased risk of injuries that the plaintiff does not
currently have.253
A. The Structure of Enhanced Risk Claims
The term "enhanced risk," which also includes "increased risk," is
defined as "the increased risk of developing a disease in the future as a
result of the defendant's conduct."2  Damages for enhanced risk of
future disease are related to damages for emotional distress based on the
fear of future disease, but they are separate and distinct from emotional
distress. Emotional distress damages compensate the plaintiff for
something that has already happened, that is, exposure that results in fear
by the plaintiff.255 When seeking damages for the increased risk of
future disease, plaintiffs want compensation for something that has not yet
insufficient to meet requirements of cause of action for products liability).
249. See Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist, 286 P. 1048 (1930) (holding that a patient
who had suffered bums to her face because of an overexposure to x-rays could recover
for the increased likelihood that she would develop cancer).
250. James D. Pagliaro & Peter J. Lynch, No Pain, No Gain: Current Trends in
Determining Compensable Injury in Toxic Tort Cases, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 10,
at 271, 271 (Aug. 9, 1989).
251. See, e.g., Amendola v. Kansas S. Ry. Co., 699 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 1988);
Donald F. Pierce, Recovery for Increased Risk of Developing a Future Injury From
Exposure to a Toxic Substance, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,256, 10,257 (1989).
According to Pierce, the weakness of this line of reasoning is that a direct connection
between the present injury that qualifies the plaintiff for damages and the threatened, more
serious disease may not exist. Id.
252. See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D. Mass. 1986).
253. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
254. Pierce, supra note 251, at 10,256.
255. See supra part IIl.
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and may never happen, i.e. actually contracting the disease.256 For a tort
system in which injury is the starting point and the anchor around
which all else revolves, this nebulous concept of injury is a major
disruption to the intellectual framework."8
As enhanced risk is a cause of action sounding in negligence, the
plaintiff must prove duty, breach, injury, and causation. 9 Assuming that
a duty not to unknowingly expose unwilling individuals to hazardous
substances exists, the plaintiff can easily establish this duty. If these
chemicals escape into the environment and members of the public are
thereby exposed to them, the defendant has breached this duty. The
questions of injury and causation are more difficult to answer. The
uniqueness of the enhanced risk cause of action is a result of the different
way of showing that the plaintiff indeed has an injury, and that the
defendant caused this injury by his negligent use or release of hazardous
substances.
The first major element of an enhanced risk claim is proving
exposure to an allegedly toxic substance for which the defendant is
responsible."z ' Proving exposure is particularly difficult when the
plaintiff alleges that the exposure occurred at low levels over a long period
of time, and that the substance was not one that leaves a permanent marker
of its presence.2 ' An additional complicating factor is demonstrating
that the plaintiff has not been exposed to other unrelated hazardous
substances. If other exposure has occurred, the defendant can claim that
those unrelated substances caused the plaintiff's condition rather than the
substances allegedly released by the defendant."
256. See MARGIE TYLER SEARCY, A GUIDE TO Toxic TORTS § 3.12[2] (1992).
257. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 30 at 165; see also Hagerty v. L & L
Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, reh'g denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying
recovery for enhanced risk in the absence of present injury but allowing the plaintiff
compensation for future medical monitoring expenses and fear of future disease); Martin
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985) (denying recovery for the cause of
future cancer in the absence of present injury).
258. Kanner, supra note 17, at 343, 346-48, 351-56.
259. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1991).
260. See Adams v. Clean Air Sys., 586 N.E.2d 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (denying
recovery because plaintiff only showed possible, but not proven, exposure).
261. See, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
262. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1261 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), affd in part, rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
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The plaintiff must next prove that the substance or substances to
which he was exposed are toxic.263 Proving a substance's toxicity to
humans, particularly at low levels of exposure over extended periods of
time, is not easy. Major cases have failed because the plaintiffs have not
been able to overcome this hurdle.2"
The plaintiff must also establish that the condition from which he
suffers is one that would not occur but for the presence of the hazardous
substance.26 A court may find a showing that the condition would not
occur in the manner and frequency in which it is now appearing but for
the exposure to a hazardous substance sufficient to establish enhanced risk.
The problem, however, is that this showing does not prove that the
plaintiff's condition occurred because of the presence of the defendant's
hazardous substance. The plaintiff must eliminate all other potential
sources to convince the court of the defendant's responsibility. 2"
The final element that the plaintiff must show in order to establish
the action for enhanced risk is that the toxic substance to which he has
been exposed will more likely than not cause him to develop the harm for
which he claims to be at risk.267 This issue of causation is the toughest
hurdle for the plaintiff to clear, and the one upon which the outcome of
most cases eventually turns.
Commentators have divided the results of courts' causation
determinations into two categories: "strong" and "weak."2" The weak
cases allow a plaintiff to survive summary judgment or directed verdict if
he has presented statistical evidence that the probability of harm to any
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1261.
265. Id.
266. See Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the Law, Toxic Waste
Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1458, 1617 (1986).
267. See id.; see also Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319, reh'g
denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986). The standard for determining if the plaintiff has
shown the disease was more likely than not the result of the hazardous substance exposure
is usually "reasonable medical certainty." This phrase is most often interpreted as
requiring a greater than 50% chance of the plaintiff actually getting the disease for which
he claims to be at risk. See Gideon v. Johns-Manville Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th
Cir. 1985).
268. Pierce, supra note 252; Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 267, at 1619.
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person exposed to substance X is greater than fifty percent.269 The
strong cases require both this statistical evidence and some evidence that
the plaintiff will be in the group that contracts the disease. If the chances
of the plaintiff developing the disease in question are less than fifty
percent, he cannot recover under either version of the more likely than not
requirement.270
In nearly all cases, providing evidence of the plaintiff's chances of
actually contracting the disease and of the toxicity of the substance will
require expert testimony." Courts will therefore face questions about
the qualifications of experts and the admissibility of novel scientific
theories.2'
B. The Single Action Rule in Enhanced Risk Cases
The necessity for the development of the doctrine of enhanced risk
derives from the single action rule. The traditional rule requires the
plaintiff to bring all of his complaints against the defendant regarding a
269. See Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 1985). A few courts
have departed from the majority rule and have allowed recovery for the enhanced risk of
future disease when the odds of the claimant getting the disease are less than probable,
i.e., less than 50%. See, e.g., Valori v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. A. No. 82-2686,
1985 WL 6074 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 1985); Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14
(D. Colo. 1984) (allowing recovery for future risk of cancer after finding that the plaintiffs
had "suffered a definite, present physical injury" in the form of subcellular damage to
chromosomes); Depass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1983) (allowing recovery
for unrelated possible future harm after finding present physical injury).
270. See Pierce, supra note 252; Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 N.W.2d 1
(1986), reh'g denied, (Mich. 1987).
271. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir.
1985).
272. James D. Pagliaro & Amelia C. Benton, Courtroom Science: Toxic Tort
Battleground, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1336 (Mar. 22, 1989).
273. See David P.C. Ashton, Comment, Decreasing the Risks Inherent in Claims for
Increased Risk of Disease, 43 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 1081, 1090-1102 (1989). Ashton
discusses other factors in the development of the enhanced risk cause of action, such as
loss of evidence over time and the possibility that the defendant may become insolvent
by the time the disease actually occurs. Ashton also argues that delaying the payment of
damages until a court is able to determine that a plaintiff will suffer the injury lessens the
deterrent effect of liability for such injuries. Id.
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single incident to the court at one time. The natural effect of this rule
is that if the plaintiff, for whatever reason, does not recover on all of her
claims in the initial suit, then those losses remain forever
uncompensated.2"
In balancing the interests of finality and judicial economy against
the benefits of accurate and full compensation, the courts adopted the
single action rule as an acceptable compromise. Over time exceptions to
the rule have emerged."' The exceptions first developed in response to
unique situations in which procedural rules or practical realities caused
different injuries from the same incident to be handled separately by the
courts. Courts allowed plaintiffs to maintain separate actions if it
determined that injustice would result through strict application of the
single action rule.27
One exception to the single action rule developed in automobile
accident cases in which the property and personal injury portions of the
claim arose from the same set of facts. Logically, evaluating damage to
an automobile is much easier than evaluating injuries to a human.
Furthermore, in many cases the true party in interest on the property
damage claim was the injured person's insurance company. In these cases
the balance of equities shifted and the previously acceptable compromise
became unacceptable. 8
The weakness of the single action rule becomes apparent when
combined with the more likely than not rule for future injury. Unless a
court either accepts the proposition that increased risk is itself an injury
that can and should be compensated,279 or allows relief from the single
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (1993).
275. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 30, at 165-66.
276. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1982); see also Rosenthal v.
Scott, 150 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1963) (holding that the single action rule did not bar a suit
for personal injuries, despite the fact the plaintiff's subrogee had already sued for property
damage from the same accident); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986) (allowing a later action
if and when asbestos exposure victim develops cancer).
277. See, e.g., Rosenthal, 150 So. 2d 436; see also Almertoh v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 587 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
278. See Emmco Ins. Co. v. Bankston, 163 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
"[It] is not unjust to the wrongdoer, who is thereby required to pay only the full amount
for which he is liable because of his wrong or tort." Id.
279. Ashton, supra note 273, at 1082.
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action rule, the plaintiff loses his right to recover for a future injury before
he is even aware of its existence.
One example of this lost cause of action is a case based on
exposure to airborne asbestos fibers. Over time exposure to a sufficient
quantity of asbestos fibers may lead to pleural thickening, a diagnosable
but usually benign'o condition involving changes in the lung's lining.2"'
Eventually some people exposed to asbestos will develop the more serious
and disabling condition called asbestosis.U2 Of those who develop
asbestosis many will develop some form of lung cancer. The progression
from one condition to the next is neither certain nor predictable. A
physician cannot say with certainty that an individual who has pleural
thickening will develop asbestosis or that an individual with asbestosis will
develop cancer. Yet, courts often allow recovery for the more serious
condition if the plaintiff can satisfy the more likely than not standard.283
The average plaintiff, however, cannot meet the more likely than not
burden because either the experts place the odds of injury at less that fifty
percent, or because the plaintiff's experts are unwilling to quantify the
plaintiff's chance of developing cancer.2"
If the plaintiff has pleural thickening or asbestosis but has not yet
developed cancer, he cannot recover for cancer unless he can prove it is
more likely than not that he will get the cancer.28 Generally, the statute
of limitations on the plaintiffs injury runs from the time the plaintiff
learned he had asbestosis. This running of the statute of limitations occurs
even in jurisdictions with the modem "discovery rule" because the plaintiff
will have knowledge of both the injury and its cause."6 If the plaintiff
files suit when the asbestosis is diagnosed, he will be unable to obtain
compensation for his potential cancer because no certainty exists that he
280. Patients with extensive pleural thickening may have difficulty breathing. CECIL
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 2362 (1988).
281. AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 228, at 2593 ("Patients with only
pleural involvement are usually asymptomatic and have normal pulmonary function.").
282. See supra note 229 (defining asbestosis).
283. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
284. See Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1986); Pollock v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 686 F. Supp. 489 (D.NJ. 1988); Ayers v. Township of
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
285. Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 1985).
286. l
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will ever develop it. If the plaintiff waits to see if the cancer develops, he
runs the risk that the statute of limitations will bar the suit.287
Thus, the potential plaintiff is faced with a choice between an
inadequate recovery if he sues immediately, and no recovery if he
waits. 88 This absurd result becomes even more ludicrous in the few
states that have not adopted the "discovery rule."2"9 In those states the
statute of limitations for a toxic exposure runs before the potential plaintiff
is even aware that an exposure has occurred.2"
As Charles Dickens's Mr. Bumble observed, the law may, on
occasion, be an ass,2 ' but the judges who make and interpret the law are
seldom happy with that state of affairs.2" Some courts have been willing
287. Statutes of limitation for personal injury claims tend to be fairly short. See, e.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (Michie 1992) (two years); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 340
(Deering 1982) (one year).
288. See, e.g., Dartez, 765 F.2d 456; Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 502
(N.J. Super. 1985).
289. The "discovery rule" means that the statute of limitations runs from the discovery
or detection of the condition and not from the exposure to the risk. W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., supra note 13, § 30 at 166-67.
290. See Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299 (N.Y. 1987), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982), overruled by statute, N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c
(Consol. Supp. 1993) (legislatively adopting the discovery rule). This result has been
modified in at least some cases by the discovery rule imposed by CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9658 (1988); see also Schiro v. American Tobacco Co., 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No.
32, at 921 (Miss. Sup. Ct. Dec. 31, 1992) (holding that the statute of limitations began to
run only when a diagnosis of cancer was confirmed, and not when the plaintiff became
suspicious and fearful that she might have cancer).
291. CHARLES DICKENS, THE ADVENTURES OF OLIVER TWIST 399 (New Oxford
Illustrated Dickens ed., Oxford University Press 1966) ("If the law supposes that, said Mr.
Bumble ... the law is a ass--a idiot.").
292. See, e.g., Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981,
986-87 (Ohio 1990); see also Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d. 821, 823 (2d Cir.
1952) (Frank, J., dissenting).
Except in topsy-turvy land you can't die before you are conceived, or
be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or
bum down a house never built, or miss a train running on a non-existent
railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been
accepted, as a sort of legal "axiom," that a statute of limitations does
not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of action
exists, i. e., before a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff. For
a limitations statute, by its inherent nature, bars a cause of action solely
because suit was not brought to assert it during a period when the suit,
326
Toxic TORTS 327
to live in what Judge Frank called "topsy-turvy land" and thus deny
recovery to a plaintiff who brings his action before contracting a disease
on ripeness grounds. Yet, these courts also acknowledge that if the plaintiff
had waited until he contracted the disease to sue, the statute of limitations
would bar his claim.293
The emerging majority of courts avoid this nonsensical result.2'
Some courts accomplish this relief by relaxing the more likely than not
requirement for future injury,295 but more courts have opted to modify,
weaken, or create an exception to the single action rule.296 Some of
these courts find that asbestosis and asbestos-related cancer are separate
and distinct disease processes.2' Accordingly, a plaintiff would be
unreasonable in bringing an action for damages that he has not yet
if begun in that period, could have been successfully maintained; the
plaintiff, in such a case, loses for the sole reason that he delayed-
beyond the time fixed by the statute- commencing his suit which, but
for the delay, he would have won. As the Connecticut Supreme Court
has said, the policy behind a limitations statute is that of penalizing one
who "sleep[s] upon his rights". But no student of such legal
somnolence has ever explained how a man can sleep on a right he does
not have.
Id, (citations omitted).
293. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir.
1985).
294. Pierce, supra note 251, at 10,262; see also David G. Poston, Comment, Gone Today
and Here Tomorrow: Damage Recovery for Subsequent Developing Latent Diseases in
Toxic Tort Exposure Actions, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 159, 167 (1990).
295. See, e.g., Valori v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. A. No. 82-2686, 1985 WL
6074, at *3 (D.NJ. Dec. 11, 1985); Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 16
(D. Colo. 1984) (allowing recovery for future risk of cancer after finding that the plaintiffs
had "suffered a definite, present physical injury" in the form of subcellular damage to
chromosomes).
296. See, e.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 533, 537 (5th Cir.),
certification denied, 467 So. 2d 529 (La. 1985), reh'g denied, 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir.
1986); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517, 521-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review
denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
297. See, e.g., Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 502 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1985); see also Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (holding that thrombophlebitis of the leg and cancer
of the breast were not products of the same chain of causality even if both were related
to the plaintiff's use of the defendant's oral contraceptives).
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suffered. Some courts have also noted that requiring a plaintiff to bring
all possible claims in a single action runs contrary to notions of judicial
economy.298
The reasoning of the asbestos cases is applicable in any case
involving similar injuries. The medical and legal communities better
understand the effects of asbestos on humans because of the large number
asbestos victims.299 The reasoning process in cases involving other
hazardous substances would be the same, although the analysis may be less
accurate due to the lack of complete information.
Allowing a modification of the single action rule makes intellectual
and logical sense for the area of latent injuries from hazardous substances.
Modification avoids ridiculous, absurd, and unjust results,3" and fosters
wise use of limited judicial resources.3"' Despite these arguments in
favor of allowing relief from the single action rule, states have not
universally adopted modifications. Several states have specifically rejected
allowing relief from the rule, including Texas3" and Pennsylvania.3 3
In the alternative, plaintiffs should be compensated for the enhanced risk
of a future disease as a remedy in the single action.
C. Enhanced Risk Damages in Perspective
Enhanced risk claims remain controversial, and the enhanced risk
cause of action in toxic tort law is still developing. This controversy and
development are the result of the current system in which tort law is a
298. This effect occurs because a plaintiff in a "single action" state is faced with the
certain loss of his rights to recover if he does not file suit. The plaintiff is forced to
litigate the issue of future cancer at the early signs of injury, instead of waiting to see if
the cancer actually develops as feared. Plaintiffs may lose most of the claims but would
probably win enough of them to cause the actions to continue. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher,
481 So. 2d at 521-23.
299. Numerous books and journal articles have been published on the medical and legal
aspects of asbestos. See, e.g., B. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL
ASPECTS (2d ed. 1986); AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 228, at 2593.
300. See Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J.,
dissenting).
301. See Gideon v. Johns-Manville Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985).
302. See id. at 1138.
303. See Ross v. Johns-Manville Corp., 766 F.2d 823, 828 (3d Cir. 1985); Cathcart v.
Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 500 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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business,3" and a business requires money to operate. Damages for
enhanced risk are potentially substantial, and one-third of a large award is
more pleasing to an attorney working on a contingent fee than is one-third
of a small award. Furthermore, unlike medical monitoring damages, these
damages will be paid in a lump sum. This potentially great reward must
be contrasted with the problem that toxic tort cases are hard to prove in
most circumstances, 05 and claims for enhanced risk are even tougher.3°
Although commentators are intrigued with the enhanced risk cause of
action, judges and legislators are not.3 ° Unless the plaintiff can prove
that he is more likely than not to contract the threatened disease, he is
unlikely to recover for the enhanced risk. In contrast, substantial risks that
are less than probable will provide excellent support for an emotional
distress cause of action. Furthermore, if the plaintiff's condition merits
special monitoring, the plaintiff may seek relief under the cause of action
for presymptom medical monitoring.08
V. ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AS A POSSIBLE BASIS OF RECOVERY
In addition to the various common law theories of recovery used
to gain compensation for individuals exposed to toxic or hazardous
substances, many environmental statutes that have been passed in the last
twenty years provide a variety of possible remedies.3 ° With one
possible exception, however, the remedies available do not include a cause
of action for personal injury damages.31° The exception is that in certain
304. Reitze, supra note 31, at 1568.
305. 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 142.
306. DORE, supra note 18, at § 7.07.
307. Id. at § 7-16.2 n.24; see also David S. Pegno, An Analysis of the Enhanced Risk of
Action (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Toxic Waste), 33 VILL. L. REV.
437, 460 (1988).
308. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, reh'g denied, 797
F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986).
309. Jeffery Trauberman, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances: An Analysis of
Existing Federal Statutes, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18-21, 26-27 (1981) (addressing
claims under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and various oil pollution
compensation statutes); Alcorn, supra note 20, at 3.
310. See, e.g., Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370, 376 (W.D. Tenn. 1985)
(holding that no private right of action for damages exists under the Clean Air Act or the
Toxic Substances Control Act); Sanford Street Local Dev. Corp. v. Textron, Inc., 768 F.
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narrowly defined circumstances, a plaintiff may be able to seek medical
monitoring costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA")31 1 or the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). 312
As a general rule, the possible remedies available for private causes
of action under the environmental statutes, also known as "citizen suits,"
are limited to injunctive relief and fines and penalties paid to the
government. Furthermore, courts have interpreted most citizen suit
provisions so that the grant of the explicit private cause of action for
injunctive relief bars any implied cause of action for any other
purposes. 3 3 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that
citizen suits under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act314 cannot be
used to redress violations that occurred entirely in the past.3"I RCRA
contains similar language, and courts have interpreted the citizen suit
provisions of RCRA to bar actions for violations that occurred entirely in
the past as well. 16
A. Medical Monitoring Under RCRA
Congress designed RCRA to deal with the production and disposal
of hazardous materials in ongoing facilities.3"7 RCRA is commonly
described as a "cradle to grave" regulatory system for hazardous
Supp. 1218, 1224 (W.D. Mich. 1991), vacated, 805 F. Supp. 29 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(holding that not only does no private right of action exist under TSCA, but that a
violation of TSCA cannot even be used to establish negligence per se under state tort law,
as this would indirectly allow what Congress had chosen to deny by direct federal action).
311. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
312. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (part of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act Amendments).
313. See, e.g., Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clanmers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 11 (1981). The citizen suit provisions are very similar. Compare RCRA § 7002,
42 U.S.C. § 6972 with CERCLA § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
314. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
315. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 63 (1987).
316. See Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1672 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 9, 1988).
317. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119; United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991).
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substances. Whereas CERCLA deals primarily with past
contamination, RCRA is concerned mostly with current operations. Thus,
RCRA's regulatory outlook is proactive rather than reactive.3 ' 9 RCRA
also contains "corrective action" provisions intended to deal with past
contamination of sites that continue to operate under its regulation.
RCRA's corrective action provisions are narrower in reach and application,
however, than are the similar provisions of CERCLA. 31
No doubt exists that the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") or the appropriate state body in a state with an
authorized RCRA program could order medical monitoring of an exposed
population.32 ' The citizen suit provisions of RCRA3n do not appear
broad enough, however, to give private litigants the right to demand
medical monitoring except in the most limited of circumstances.3 3
318. Roberta G. Gordon, Legal Incentives for Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling: A New
Approach to Hazardous Waste Management, 95 YALE L.L 810, 811 & n.9, 812 (1986).
319. IL
320. See, e.g., RCRA § 3019, 42 U.S.C. § 6939a (providing for health assessments at
landfills and surface impoundments); id. § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (dealing with the
general power of the EPA Administrator to require corrective action by permitted
facilities, including the authority to require that corrective action extend beyond the
premises of that facility unless the adjoining landowner refuses to permit it).
321. Id. § 3013(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6934(a). The monitoring would be accomplished by the
Administrator of EPA requesting that the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry ("ATSDR") conduct a preliminary health assessment, to be followed by "full
scale health and epidemiological studies and medical evaluations" if indicated. Id §
3019(0, 42 U.S.C. § 6939a(f). This monitoring pattern is the same monitoring scheme
required for a CERCLA site; the scheme is implemented through RCRA and the
corrective action rules.
322. Id § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
323. Cf McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ohio
1987), affd, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that under RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972, a citizen suit is possible only when the state and federal authorities have not acted'
and notice has been given to the Administrator of EPA 60 days before filing suit).
Members of the public "may submit evidence of releases of or exposure to hazardous
constituents" to the Administrator of ATSDR, the Administrator of EPA, or to a state with
an authorized RCRA program, but they can not demand that the government actor take
any particular action based on that information. RCRA § 3019, 42 U.S.C. § 6939a(c).
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In Werlein v. United States,324 the only reported case in which
medical monitoring was sought under RCRA, the court denied medical
monitoring on summary judgment. The court may have rejected medical
monitoring, however, because the proposed relief was structured as a lump
sum payment to the plaintiffs to be used for their future medical
monitoring.325 The court stated that it objected to the award of medical
monitoring expenses in these circumstances, but that it might consider a
medical monitoring remedy under RCRA in the future.326 In particular,
the court objected to awarding a large lump sum payment to the plaintiffs
under its power to award "injunctive relief. 3 27
The court in Werlein relied on Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.3 21 to reject medical monitoring as a remedy.3 29  In Barth, the
plaintiffs requested medical monitoring in order to gather and share
information regarding exposure.3 ' The court in Werlein found this type
of relief to be a proper form of injunctive relief.33' Thus, medical
monitoring under RCRA would likely be limited to situations such as the
one in Barth, in which information must be gathered to assess the effects
on the public health. If medical monitoring is awarded, the form of the
remedy will be a court-supervised fund controlled by a public agency.332
324. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn.
1992). Werlein was filed under the RCRA citizen suit provision, RCRA § 7002, 42
U.S.C. § 6972, which allows "any person" to file a suit against a defendant who is
"alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter." If the plaintiff
alleges that the permit applicant did not comply with the monitoring provisions of RCRA
§ 3019, 42 U.S.C. 6939a, the plaintiff may have a cause of action against both the
applicant and the Administrator. Similarly, if the monitoring provisions were included in
the permit but were not being enforced, the plaintiff may have a viable cause of action
under RCRA. The existence of a RCRA cause of action is also dependent on compliance
with the other procedural hurdles, i.e., no state or federal enforcement actions and 60-days
notice. See id. § 7002(b), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b), (c); see also McGregor, 709 F. Supp.
1401.
325. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 895.
326. Id.
327. id.
328. 661 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Cal.), revised, 673 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
329. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 895.
330. Barth, 661 F. Supp. at 203-04.
331. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 895.
332. See, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (holding that a
court-supervised fund is the preferred method of handling medical monitoring awards).
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B. Medical Monitoring Under CERCLA
1. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Private actions are not the only option for providing services
traditionally considered to be medical monitoring. Section 104(i) of
CERCLA333 establishes the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry ("ATSDR"). The 1986 amendments to CERCLA334 granted
ATSDR a complicated scheme of functions relating to the assessment of
health effects of actual and threatened hazardous substance releases. 35
For example, ATSDR is required to conduct formal health assessments for
every National Priorities List ("NPL") facility.336 Additionally, ATSDR
is authorized to conduct formal health assessments on other sites if
provided with information from individuals or physicians regarding human
contact with released hazardous materials.37  These physicians and
individuals may then petition the ATSDR to perform a health assessment.
If ATSDR denies the request, they must provide a written explanation of
why an assessment is not appropriate.338  In performing health
assessments, ATSDR considers a variety of factors that indicate the degree
of risk to human health.339  Depending on the results of the health
assessment, ATSDR may conduct pilot epidemiologic studies 3 ° and
333. CERCLA § 104(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i).
334. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 and
scattered sections elsewhere).
335. See, e.g., id. § 110, 100 Stat. 1636-42; see generally Ambrogi v. Gould Inc., 750
F. Supp. 1233, 1249 (M.D. Pa. 1990) ("To remedy the perceived inadequacies of the 1980
enactment, Congress created an expanded role for the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry ("ATSDR") to provide medical examinations and testing of exposed
individuals including 'tissue sampling, chromosomal testing, epidemiological studies, or
any other assistance appropriate under the circumstances."); SUSAN M. COOKE, THE LAW
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY AND LITIGATION §
13.01[4][d][vii] (1992) (overview of ATSDR health assessment functions under section
104(i) as amended by SARA).
336. CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(A). The NPL is a list of all
"known releases or threatened releases throughout the United States" which is used for
assigning the priority for remedial actions. Id. § 105(a)(8)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B).
337. 1d. § 104 (i)(6)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(B).
338. I&
339. Id. § 104(i)(6)(F), 42 U.S.C. §. 9604(i)(6)(F).
340. Ia& § 104(i)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(7).
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establish a registry of exposed persons.34' In the case of a serious health
risk ATSDR may establish a long-term health surveillance program. This
program may include periodic medical testing and a treatment referral
mechanism for persons who are screened positive.342
This scheme appears to be an excellent solution from a medical and
scientific standpoint, but it suffers from at least two practical defects. The
first is that the ATSDR is still getting "geared up" for the massive task of
surveying all NPL sites; it has more work to do than it has resources with
which to do it.343 The second is that exposed persons cannot gain direct
access to any of the money from ATSDR, nor can they direct ATSDR in
their actions.3" ATSDR's findings and reports are available to plaintiffs
and their lawyers, however, in any tort suits filed regarding injuries from
the contamination.' 4
2. Private Actions Under CERCLA
Plaintiffs may also seek medical monitoring costs under CERCLA
in private actions. The analysis under CERCLA varies somewhat from that
under RCRA as a consequence of the nature of the two programs.
Congress had a different set of goals and objectives in passing CERCLA
as compared to RCRA.3" Whereas RCRA was designed to prevent
disasters before they happen by regulating ongoing operations, CERCLA
deals with closed or abandoned sites of hazardous chemical releases. The
341. Id. § 104(i)(8), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(8).
342. Id. § 104(i)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(9).
343. Hazardous Substances, Statutory Deadline Blamed for Inadequacy of Superfund
Health Assessments by ATSDR, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Sept. 5, 1991,
at A-7.
344. To the extent that attorneys of exposed individuals played a role in the decision to
grant the monitoring by ATSDR, they might be able to make a claim for fees as a
response cost. An article of faith among toxic tort defense lawyers, although seldom
mentioned in the literature, is that the real reason plaintiffs want medical monitoring as
interim relief is to provide money to pay the experts in the companion toxic tort suits.
345. For a general discussion of ATSDR, see James A. Rogers, The Potential Role of
Superfund in Toxic Tort Litigation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 13 (1988).
346. CERCLA's primary purpose is "to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste
sites by placing the ultimate financial responsibility for cleanup on those responsible for
the hazardous wastes." Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir.
1985).
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text of both statutes is less than a model of legislative clarity,347 however,
and the legislative history is uncertain at best.348
As proposed, CERCLA was to create a comprehensive response to
the leakage of hazardous substances into the environment, but most of the
provisions related to leakage were cut as the various interests fought over
the contents and fate of the bills. When first introduced, the bills that later
became CERCLA provided for a distinct and independent federal cause of
action for personal injuries caused by exposure to hazardous chemicals.3 49
During the legislative process, however, those provisions were
abandoned.3' Although this compromise removed the cause of action
for general personal injury damages, it did not completely settle the
question of whether a court could award medical monitoring in a CERCLA
action. This ambiguity remains because CERCLA authorizes private
litigants to recover "response costs" from the party or parties who caused
the release of the hazardous substance into the environment. Thus, by
characterizing medical monitoring as a response cost, it is, theoretically at
least, possible to recover medical monitoring costs under CERCLA. In
cleanups directed by a governmental agency, the government need prove
only that the costs incurred were "not inconsistent with the National
347. For example, the tenth circuit has referenced CERCLA's "notorious lack of clarity."
Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992).
348. Id.; see Ambrogi v. Gould, 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1244 (M.D. Pa. 1990) ("Because
of its varied and extensive record of passage, the use of CERCLA's legislative history has
its limits."); see also 126 CONG. REc. 31,969 (1980) (statement of Rep. Broyhill).
349. The 96th Congress fully considered three major hazardous substance response bills,
in addition to a Carter administration bill which died in committee. See 1 ENVTL L.
INsT., SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY xiii (1983).
350. Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virginia was cosponsor of one of the bills that
became CERCLA. He expressly acknowledged the intentional deletion of any private
cause of action for personal injury. The Senator stated that "[w]e have deleted the Federal
cause of action for medical expenses or income loss." 126 CONG. REC. 14,964 (daily ed.
Nov. 24, 1980), reprinted in 2 ENVTL. L. INST., SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
260 (1993). Given Senator Randolph's status as a cosponsor of the compromise bill,
courts have found his statements a reliable indicator of congressional intent to exclude
"medical expenses" from recovery. This reliability is reasonable especially because the
Senate passed the bill the same day the remarks were made, and the full Congress
approved it two weeks later. Patricia A. Shackelford, Comment, Easing the Credit
Crunch: A "Functional" Approach To Lender Control Liability Under CERCLA, 19 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 805 (1992); see also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512, 526-27 (1982) (noting "authoritative" status of the remarks of the sponsor of a bill).
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Contingency Plan."35' A private party claiming response costs, however,
has the burden of proving the expenses were "consistent" with the
NCP. 352
To recover medical monitoring costs, a plaintiff must first show
that medical monitoring is a response cost. "Response cost" is not defined
in CERCLA's definition section.353 A definition of "response" exists and
provides that "[tihe terms 'respond' or 'response' mean remove, removal,
remedy and remedial action;, [sic] all such terms (including the terms
'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related
thereto.'3  The terms "remove," "removal," "remedy," and "remedial
action" all have their specified CERCLA meanings:
(23) The terms "remove" or "removal" means the cleanup
or removal of released hazardous substances from the
environment ... such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release
of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material,
or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health
or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise
result from a release or threat of release.
(24) The terms "remedy" or "remedial action" means those
actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of
or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release
or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the
environment, to prevent or minimize the release of
hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or
welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not
limited to, such actions at the location of the release ... any
monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions
351. The National Contingency Plan ("NCP") is an overall blueprint for how cleanups
should be conducted. See CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605; 40 CFR § 300.1-.920.
352. The question of consistency under the NCP is a factual determination that "cannot
be made on the basis of the pleadings but must await development of a factual record."
Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
353. CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
354. Id. § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
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protect the public health and welfare and the
environment.355
The total impact of the above definitions is that a "response cost"
is a cost incurred in responding to a release or threatened release of toxic
or hazardous substances. These costs may be in the nature of an
immediate reaction, which is called a removal action, or a long-term
cleanup, which is called a remedial action. Because a removal action
includes actions that "may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate
the release or threat of release of hazardous substances,"356 the definition
of response costs might include medical monitoring for exposed
individuals if the purpose of the monitoring was to "monitor, assess, and
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances."3 If
the purpose of the monitoring is to protect the health of an individual,
rather than the public at large, the monitoring will not likely be a covered
response cost.
The courts are split on whether medical monitoring costs are
properly an element of private response costs under CERCLA. Some
courts find decisively that they are not. Others hold that perhaps, in the
right circumstances, they might be. Complicating the issue is the problem
that all the leading cases in which the courts find medical monitoring costs
possible under CERCLA are federal district court cases. The only circuit
court of appeals decision on the question held that medical monitoring
expenses were not a proper response cost when claimed by a private
party.35
8
Additionally, no recorded case exists in which a court has actually
awarded medical monitoring expenses as an element of response costs
under CERCLA. The issue has always arisen when the court is confronted
by a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Therefore, the court has
only had to decide whether any possible construction of facts pleaded
might allow the award, and not whether the plaintiff is actually entitled
such an award.39 The fact that courts have denied defendants' motions
355. Id § 101(23), (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), (24).
356. Id § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
357. Id.
358. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
359. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For example, the court in Brewer
v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), ruled that "the Court cannot say that it
appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their CERCLA
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for summary judgment on the question is far from a ringing endorsement
for the plaintiffs' claims. 3 °
Medical monitoring expenses are possible because of the extremely
broad definition of "response costs" under CERCLA. Though no reported
decision has awarded medical monitoring expenses as a response cost
under CERCLA, several decisions have left the door open to do so.
36
'
In these decisions, the courts have consistently held that the claimant must
establish that the monitoring is needed to assess the extent of the
contamination or for another valid public health purpose362 and that the
testing is "consistent with the national contingency plan. '363 Because the
purpose of the NCP is to ensure that cleanups are conducted in an efficient
and cost effective manner," it is unlikely that a court would ever
approve a claim for medical monitoring expenses that duplicated services
already provided by the ATSDR.
Medical monitoring is undoubtedly of a very private nature and
therefore recovery under CERCLA is extremely unlikely to occur.
3 65
Additionally, no doubt exists that the ATSDR has broad power and
discretion to conduct monitoring of the communities affected by the
release of hazardous substances,36 even though some commentators
question whether the ATSDR has the resources or will to conduct the
claim." Id. at 1180. Similarly, in Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio
1984), the court said "[i]n light of the present procedural posture of the case, we cannot
say as a matter of law that the plaintiffs are not so entitled." Id. at 1430.
360. Williams v. Allied Automotive, Autolite Div., 704 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D. Ohio
1988) ("costs of future medical monitoring are not categorically unrecoverable as response
costs under CERCLA").
361. See, e.g., id.
362. For example, the court in Brewer held, "To the extent that plaintiffs seek to recover
the cost of medical testing and screening conducted to assess the effect of the release or
discharge on public health or to identify potential public health problems presented by the
release, however, they present a cognizable claim under section 9607(a)." Brewer, 680
F. Supp. at 1179 (emphasis in original).
363. Williams, 704 F. Supp. at 784.
364. Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1430 (citing City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135, 1144 n.16 (E.D. Pa. 1982)). But see Stepan Chem., 544 F. Supp. at 1141
(denying defendant's argument even though doing so would create a "merry go round of
litigation").
365. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179.
366. CoOKE, supra note 335, at § 13.01[4][d][vil.
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task. 67 The sole remaining question, therefore, is whether medical
monitoring expenses incurred by a private party may ever be deemed a
proper response cost under CERCLA. Several courts have held that they
cannot.368 Their reasoning is instructive and persuasive.
The courts considering this issue rely on several key points. First,
that "when Congress wanted to provide for medical care and testing, it
knew how do so in explicit language."369 Second, the courts found the
legislative history of CERCLA to be instructive.37 Senator Jennings
Randolph remarked during debate that "we have deleted the federal cause
of action for medical expenses or income loss.""' Third, the courts noted
that the provisions regarding "monitoring" in section 104 of CERCLA
relate only to "removal" actions under section 107"7 and are limited by
the language in the provision.
The tenth circuit, in Daigle v. United States,373 ruled that "the
'monitor[ing]' allowed for under the 'removal action' definition relates
under the plain statutory language only to an evaluation of the extent of
a 'release or threat of release of hazardous substances. ''374 The court
then decided that the "remedial action" definition focused expressly on
actions necessary to "prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to
present or future public health or welfare or the environment""37 and that
remedial actions did not include long term-medical monitoring.376
367. Federal Public Health Studies Misleading, Citizens Endangered By Toxic Waste,
Group Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA), July 3, 1992, at 721.
368. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992); Ambrogi v. Gould,
750 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Coburn v. Sun Chem., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1665 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988).
369. Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas., at 1670.
370. See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1536; Cook v. Rockwell Int'l, 755 F. Supp 1468, 1474 (D.
Colo. 1991); Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665; Werlein v. United States, 746 F.
Supp. 887, 903 (D. Minn. 1990). Both Werlein and Cook cited Coburn and quoted
Senator Randolph. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 902; Cook, 755 F. Supp. at 1473.
371. 126 CONG. REc. 14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980), reprinted in 2 ENVTL. L. INST.,
supra note 350, at 260.
372. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
373. 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
374. l at 1535 (citing to CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)).
375. Id. (citing to CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)).
376. Il at 1537.
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The line of cases beginning with a magistrate's decision in Chaplin
v. Exxon377 and running through the tenth circuit's decision in Daigle v.
United States all stand for the proposition that the general provision for
prevention or mitigation of "damage to public health or welfare" must be
narrowly interpreted. This construction is consistent with the specific
examples of "removal costs" set forth in the definition.378 In so deciding,
these courts relied on the fact that the statutory definitions of each of these
words do not contain any references whatsoever to medical expenses of
any kind. They also found that these sections do not support any
inferences that such expenses are recoverable response costs under
CERCLA. Instead, these courts interpreted the definitions as
contemplating only the cleanup of toxic substances from the environment.
For example the district court in Ambrogi v. Gould said:
Quite simply, we find it difficult to understand how future
medical testing and monitoring of persons who were
exposed to contaminated well water prior to the remedial
measures currently underway will do anything to "monitor,
assess, [or] evaluate a release" of contamination from the
site" as a partial explanation for its order dismissing the
plaintiffs claim for medical monitoring.379
Similarly the tenth circuit in Daigle remarked:
Longterm health monitoring of the sort requested by
Plaintiffs ... "to assist plaintiffs and class members in the
prevention or early detection and treatment of chronic
disease," ... clearly has nothing to do with preventing
contact between a "release or threatened release" and the
public. The release has already occurred.8 0
377. 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2009 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 1986).
378. See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535; Ambrogi v. Gould, 750 F. Supp. 1223, 1247 (M.D.
Pa. 1990). The decision in Daigle is beginning to be recognized by district courts in other
circuits. See Price v. United States Navy, 1992 WL 469880 (S.D. Cal 1992).
379. Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1246 (quoting Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 19 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988)).
380. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
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The key to the courts' negative conclusion concerning the recovery
of medical monitoring costs under CERCLA is that the plaintiffs were
really requesting future medical expenses. Though perhaps needed to
protect the health of an individual, future medical expenses are not
monitoring or assessment to determine the health or exposure level of a
community. These courts determined that the plaintiffs were using
"medical monitoring" in its medical3 1 or tort law.82 sense, and not as
it was meant by the drafters of CERCLA 3"
Whether medical monitoring will ever be considered a proper
response cost is uncertain. This uncertainty arises because the area is very
fact-specific. Even when, as in Daigle or Cobum, judges make broad
rulings, the justification for these rulings rests on narrow factual
distinctions. The right set of facts to support medical monitoring expenses
as a CERCLA response cost may exist, but it would have to involve a
substance about which very little is known so that testing would be
necessary to determine how much of a risk the substance presents to the
population at large. Next, ATSDR would have to decline to study the
substance.3" If ATSDR is studying the issue, a competing private study
would be unnecessary and wasteful and therefore not "consistent with the
NCP."38  Medical monitoring trusts will continue to appear in
settlements in which other viable claims are involved in the litigation.
These settlements will involve all claims, including CERCLA and common
law claims.38
381. Beeller & Sappenfield, supra note 58.
382. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 961 (1991).
383. Daigle, 972 F.2d 1527; cf Walter Wheeler Cook, Substance and Procedure in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE LJ. 333, 337 (1933).
384. This refusal might well take the following form: "This is a worthwhile site for a
study, but the agency has no funds with which to perform one."
385. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
386. See In re Fernald Litig., 1989 WL 267038 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (approving $73 million
settlement after summary jury trial indicated problems with the government's case); In re
Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affid, 818 F.2d 145
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Pinkney v. Dow Chem. Co., 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
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VI. ISSUES UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Issues specific to the Federal Tort Claims Act3 7 ("FTCA") in the
area of the government's liability for damages from toxic torts relate to the
government's waiver of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity in this
context means that the sovereign cannot be sued unless it has consented
to be sued.3 8 Prior to the FTCA, an individual injured due to the
negligence of the government or a government employee had no remedy
in the courts." 9 The only possibility of compensation was to request a
private relief bill through the Congress."'
The passage of the FTCA did not end the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, but only modified and limited it. The FTCA allows suits
against the United States only in certain circumstances. Actions not within
these confines continue to be barred.39" ' Courts generally construe
waivers of sovereign immunity strictly and narrowly." 2  Furthermore,
federal rather than state law determines whether a cause of action is
excluded by the FTCA.393 The plaintiffs claim must fit within a
category for which the FTCA waives immunity as a prerequisite to
jurisdiction under the Act.394
The basic concept of the FTCA is that within the scope of the
limited waiver of sovereign immunity, state law applies to the United
States as if it where a private individual. The Act waives immunity for
actions:
for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
387. Act of June 25, 1948, Ch. 646, 2 Stat. 933 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)).
388. See Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Commissioners, 333 F. Supp. 353
(E.D. La. 1971).
389. The injured party could sue the individual government employee, but that was
unlikely to result in more than moral satisfaction, as the average government employee
had limited financial resources. See JAYSON, supra note 14, at § 51.
390. See German Bank v. United States, 148 U.S. 573 (1893).
391. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
392. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941); United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
393. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
394. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
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wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. 95
The courts have interpreted the "negligent or wrongful act or
omission"396 limitation to bar suits that sound in any other theory of
liability except negligence. For example, the FTCA does not include suits
based on strict liability397 nor those based on a theory of implied or
expressed warranty.398 Similarly, the Act generally prohibits suits
seeking damages that are equitable in nature.3
If the cause of action fails outside the scope of the waiver of
sovereign immunity, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the case. In analyzing claims for "non impact damages" against the United
States, the court must first question whether the law of the state where the
injury allegedly occurred allows claims for these damages.4" Because
the FTCA applies state law to the United States as if it were a private
person, state law is controlling.4"' Once the court determines that the
state law allows recovery of these damages, the court must then determine
395. Id. Other issues beyond the scope of this Article affect the waiver of sovereign
immunity, chief among which is the discretionary function exception.
396. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
397. Laird, 406 U.S. 797; Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1952); Thompson v.
United States, 592 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979).
398. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 503 (D.S.C. 1984).
399. See, e.g., Westbay Steel, Inc. v. United States, 970 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1992);
Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 335 (2d Cir. 1978); Moon v. Takisaki, 501 F.2d
389, 390 (9th Cir. 1974). But see In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 629 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(allowing some declaratory relief in the course of class action litigation involving an
aircraft accident).
400. When determining whether the state allows damages, the court looks to the state's
choice of law rules. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962); Transco Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1990).
401. The plaintiff must comply with some uniquely federal procedural requirements.
Filing an administrative claim for an amount not exceeding the amount sought in court
is a prerequisite to the district court having jurisdiction to hear the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2675
(1988).
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the basis for these awards.4° On the other hand, if the state would not
allow these damages to be claimed against a private party, then there is no
cause of action under the FTCA and the analysis ends. 3
If the law of the state allows damages of the sort in question and
the theory upon which the damages will be awarded is one that sounds in
negligence, the damage claim against the United States can go forward on
the merits. However, if the courts of the state base their authority to
award the damages on their general equitable powers, the portion of the
suit seeking such damages would be beyond the scope of the waiver of
sovereign immunity contained in the FTCA. 4 The court is without
jurisdiction to even hear that portion of the claim if there is no waiver of
sovereign immunity.4"5 If no controlling state precedent on point is
available, the federal court must make its best Erie4°6 guess about how
the state's courts would decide the issue.4"7
Questions of the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity under
the FTCA have arisen primarily in the area of medical monitoring, as little
doubt or controversy exists about the nature of claims for emotional
distress or enhanced risk.4"8 Two federal district courts have examined
402. The law the state will apply will usually be its own. As choice of law rules come
into play, however, the law of the place of negligence and not the place of injury, if they
are different, may apply. For example, this application could occur when an airplane is
negligently repaired in state X, which causes it to crash and cause injury in state Y, while
the injured persons were citizens of state Z. Venue might lie in either state X,Y, or Z.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1988) (choice of law depends on where the court decides the
"act or omission" occurred (X or Y)); Forest v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 171 (C.D.
Mont. 1982) (holding that choice of law for damages might be the place of the act or
omission, the place of injury or the place of the plaintiff's residence); Reich v. Purcell,
432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967); Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292 (1987).
403. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1993).
404. Moon v. Takisaki, 501 F.2d 389, 390 (9th Cir. 1974).
405. Id.
406. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
407. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
408. But see Laswell v. Brown, 524 F. Supp. 847, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1981), affd, 683 F.2d
261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983) (stating that no claim exists for
increased risk of future injury without present injury).
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claims for medical monitoring under the Federal Tort Claims Act.'
Because of variations in state law, the courts' conclusions differed.
In Burke v. United States,10 the magistrate ruled that because
California had not recognized either a cause of action for medical
monitoring or the right to recover medical monitoring as an element of
damages under an existing cause of action, the only way that a court could
award such damages was through its general equitable powers. The
magistrate further ruled, relying on Moon v. Takisaki,4" that because the
relief requested was equitable in nature412 and the United States had not
waived its sovereign immunity as to equitable relief, the plaintiff did not
have a valid cause of action against the United States. Summary judgment
was granted accordingly in favor of the United States.4'3
The opposite result was reached under Pennsylvania law in Redland
Soccer Club, Inc. v. United States.1 4 When ruling on the government's
motion for summary judgment, the court stated that because the plaintiff
was seeking a specified amount of money, the damages were legal, not
equitable, in nature.45 Relying on Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc.,416 the
court concluded that the plaintiff's demand was within the scope of the
FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.4 7
409. See Burke v. United States, No. CV F-89-455 DLB (E.D. Cal. April 15, 1991);
Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. United States, Civ. No. 1:CV-90-1072 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12,
1992). But see Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 902-04 (D. Minn. 1990).
In Werlein, the plaintiffs claimed medical monitoring under both CERCLA and Minnesota
common law. The court found that the plaintiffs could not recover medical monitoring
under CERCLA, but that they could claim medical monitoring as an element of damages
under the common law of Minnesota. The court did not address the issue of the
recoverability of medical monitoring under the FTCA. Id.
410. No. CV F-89-455 DLB (E.D. Cal. April 15, 1991).
411. 501 F.2d 389, 390 (9th Cir. 1974).
412. Accord Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(recognizing medical monitoring in California but only as an equitable remedy).
413. The California Supreme Court has recently approved damages for medical
monitoring at law. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
This holding will presumably open the door for medical monitoring claims under the
FTCA.
414. Civ. No. 1:CV-90-1072 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1992).
415. Id.
416. 677 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
417. 663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (allowing a claim for medical monitoring to go
forward, treating the claim as one for legal damages in the nature of future medical
expenses); see also Peterman v. Techalloy Co., 29 Pa. D. & C.3d 104 (1982). Some
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Accordingly, whether a plaintiff can recover medical monitoring
expenses from the United States depends on whether the state allows such
damages, as well as the type of authority the state courts use to award
those damages." 8 The success of a plaintiff's claim may turn on the
manner in which the plaintiff's counsel chooses to plead the claim. In the
event the plaintiff's counsel errs, the trial judge may opt to rescue the
attorney from his inartful pleading.
For example, in Villari v. Terminix Int'l Inc.,419 the plaintiff
requested a "constructive trust sufficient to pay the cost of medical
detection and medical monitoring." 42" Although constructive trusts are
generally considered equitable remedies, the court chose to treat the claim
as one for legal damages. In an FTCA action, however, the administrative
claim and sum certain requirements may not give a court the same
flexibility to rescue a claimant's attorney from her missteps.
Also instructive in this vein is MoIzof v. United States,421 in which
the United States Supreme Court interpreted the exclusion of punitive
damages from FTCA coverage narrowly. 22 Molzof involved a veteran
who had been left in a comatose state because of medical malpractice.
The government claimed that damages for the loss of enjoyment of life by
a comatose patient were "punitive in nature." 4" Because the plaintiff
was in a coma, the government argued, he did not know that he was not
enjoying life. The government reasoned that damages could not
"compensate" him for an injury of which he was unaware, and therefore
they were "punitive."424 The Court rejected the government's claim and
remanded the case to the trial court to determine if the damages in
question could be recovered under state law.4' This decision may
indicate the Court's hostility to attempts by plaintiffs to use what it
considers to be a shield protecting essential governmental functions as a
Pennsylvania trial courts have held medical monitoring costs to be equitable remedies,
however. Habitants Against Landfill Toxicants (HALT) v. City of York, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,937 (Pa. Ct. C.P., May 20, 1985).
418. See Burke, No. CV F-89-455 DLB (E.D. Cal. April 15, 1991); Redland Soccer Club,
Inc. v. United States, Civ. No. 1:CV-90-1-72 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1992).
419. 677 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
420. Id. at 338.
421. 112 S. Ct. 711 (1992).
422. Id. at 718.
423. Id. at 714.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 718.
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defense to a run of the mill negligence case. The Court may similarly
address the government's characterization of medical monitoring damages
as an equitable remedy. Conversely, this decision may simply indicate that
this case was factually bad for the government.
No uniquely federal aspects exist for claims of emotional distress
without present injury or for enhanced risk claims.426 The obstacles to
a plaintiff's recovery of these damages are based entirely on state law
applied to the United States by operation of the FTCA.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. A Changing World
The complexity of toxic tort litigation is a reflection of the
increased complexity of modem society and its technology. Not until this
century were the first effective antibiotic drugs developed, and only in the
second half of the century have they became commonly used.427 Only
in the last twenty years have we come to understand the side effects of
modem technology. The release of toxic by-products into the environment
is the unintended and uncontemplated price we pay for technology. These
by-products result in injuries to those who have the misfortune to become
exposed to them.4"
These injuries may take years or generations to appear and have
tested the ability of the common law tort system to redress the harm.429
To deal with these injuries some commentators have called for major
426. Cf id. (refusing to determine what damages are punitive as a matter of federal law
and remanding for the trial court to determine if the damages in question were allowed
as a matter of state law); see also Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir
1990); Waffen v. United States, 799 F.2d 911, 917 (4th Cir 1986).
427. JOHN PARASCONDOLA, ED. THE HISTORY OF ANTIBIOTICS 1 (1980).
428. Alcorn, supra note 20, at 3 ("The term 'toxic tort' is a product - albeit an
undesirable one - of modem industrialization. In broad terms, it encompasses any
wrongful injury resulting from exposure to one or more hazardous substances"). In Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1943), Justice Black described this situation
as "the human overhead," which he observed was "an inevitable part of the cost--to
someone-of the doing industrialized business." Id. at 58.
429. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 267.
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changes, wholesale reform or even abandonment of the tort system.43
The system, however, has responded to the challenge in inconsistent ways.
B. A New Definition of Injury
A major part of this response has been an expansion in the
definition of injury. This has in turn modified the damages a plaintiff can
recover. Under traditional common law there could be no recovery in tort
without physical contact that caused bodily harm.43' Assault was the
only exception because assault was an injury to the plaintiffs right to be
free from fear or apprehension of bodily harm and not an injury to the
plaintiff himself.432
As society and technology have changed, the law has changed with
them. Nonimpact damages are a result of that change. Medical
monitoring, fear of future disease, and claims for enhanced risk of future
disease are not separate intellectual doctrines, but are merely way-stations
in a continuous stream that has been set in motion by the changes that
have occurred in the second half of the twentieth century.
When injuries were limited to those that could be seen, and
medicine was limited to setting broken bones, stopping bleeding, and
applying leeches, there was no need for regular visits to a physician to see
if one was developing signs of disease. However, in today's world
medical monitoring to detect signs of cancer and allow for early treatment
can be a lifesaving practice.433 Neither Lord Coke nor William Prosser
encountered the situation where 100 people were exposed to an invisible
but potent agent which, over the course of twenty years, will cause one of
those persons to suffer from a deadly disease. They did not have to deal
with diseases that might be successfully treated when detected early
enough.434
430. See, e.g., Jeffery Trauberman, Statutory Reform of 'Toxic Torts:' Relieving Legal,
Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177,
188-89 (1983).
431. Pierce, supra note 251; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 30, at 165.
432. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., supra note 13, § 10, at 43.
433. Gara, supra note 141.
434. For the purpose of this discussion, this Article assumes that this situation results in
a disease (like lung or breast cancer) that has both reliable tests for its occurrence and
practical therapies for its detection. The Article also assumes that the increased survival
rate is a factor of the early detection, and not just as result of a longer period to follow
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The idea of medical monitoring damages developed in response to
this type of situation. It is the first step in the line of nonimpact damages.
Medical monitoring expenses are only a small step from the future medical
expenses that are a regular and accepted part of all personal injury
litigation.435 They are basically future medical expenses allowed for a
different type of invisible and contingent injury. The courts have
disagreed on how different and how contingent that injury can be,4 36 but
these are differences in degree rather than kind. The nature of the remedy
also remains unsettled. Some courts have awarded lump sums as a legal
remedy while others have used their equitable powers to create trusts.
Much of the same evidence that supports medical monitoring is
also necessary to support a claim for emotional distress caused by the fear
of future injury. To recover for emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove
that he has been exposed to the hazardous substance, that as a result of
that exposure he has suffered emotional distress, and that the fear which
causes his distress is "reasonable." '437
This cause of action is also not without its variations. In some
jurisdictions, the plaintiff may need to prove some form of physical impact
or injury.438  The courts diverge greatly on what may constitute an
impact or injury. In practice, the terminology employed by the court may
not accurately reflect its doctrine and the line separating the two rules has
blurred.
At the top of the pyramid of nonimpact damages is the chance of
recovery for pure enhanced risk. Enhanced risk is a basic tort action in
which the injury is the present risk of future disease. The enhanced risk
cause of action is at the top of the pyramid from the plaintiff's perspective
because it involves the greatest amount of money. Usually at issue is an
increased risk of disabling or fatal diseases, frequently cancer.4 39  But,
the patient before his or her death because of the early detection. See Gots, supra note
154, at 24; Beeller & Sappenfield, supra note 58.
435. CHARLEs T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 90 (1935);
Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319, modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th
Cir. 1986).
436. The courts' answers have ranged from very to not at all. Ayers v. Township of
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 at 312 (N.J. 1987); Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36
(4th Cir. 1991).
437. Dworkin, supra note 174.
438. l
439. Brent Carson, Comment, Increased Risk of Disease From Hazardous Waste: A
Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635 (1985).
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because the cause of action rests on the mere potential to develop the
disease, a plaintiff seeking damages for increased risk also faces the
highest barriers to recovery. These barriers take the form of burdens of
proof that in most jurisdictions require the plaintiff to show that he is more
likely than not to develop the disease for which she is at risk."'
However, in most cases the science is not available that will allow the
plaintiff to meet this burden.
C. The Limited Utility of Federal Statutes
Federal laws currently are of little help to plaintiffs seeking redress
for non-impact toxic torts. The only remedies available pursuant to
CERCLA and RCRA are for medical monitoring. Under these statutes, a
plaintiff may have more hoops to jump through than under state law.
The Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity for the
United States in state law negligence actions. However, the utility of this
waiver is limited in medical monitoring cases. The Act prohibits recovery
in actions yielding equitable remedies and therefore may block recovery
if the applicable state law employs such a remedy. When the Act prevents
a victim who has been exposed to hazardous substances due to the
negligent actions of the federal government from recovering for his
injuries, it defeats both the purpose of tort law and the intent of the FTCA.
Accordingly, the statute should be changed to allow recovery of all
compensatory damages available under the law of the state, whether their
origins sound in equity or tort.
The final hope for plaintiffs is the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry. This agency must undertake formal health
assessments at all CERCLA NPL sites, and other sites as it deems
necessary. The agency also may initiate periodic medical surveillance.
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, no private party can exert any control on how
the agency carries out this function.
D. A Unified Theory?
The common thread running from medical monitoring through
damages for fear of future disease to claims for increased risk of future
440. DORE, supra note 18, at § 7-16.3; Ashton, supra note 273.
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disease is the attempt of the law of torts to adapt to new kinds of injuries.
Exposure to toxic substances is injury and risk is injury."' However,
they are injuries that for reasons of both practicality and policy cannot be
fully compensated in present terms or current dollars. That there are some
cases where injury may go uncompensated is not a new concept in tort
law. Professor Keeton has noted that "it does not lie within the power of
any judicial system to remedy all human wrongs.""' 2  Mere exposure
without physical effect is the part of the "human overhead" that is
allocated to the individual as his share of "the cost of living in an
organized society."" 3
To the extent that an individual exposed to toxic substances is
forced to undergo medical testing and monitoring due to his exposure, he
suffers a compensable injury. His remedy is a claim for medical
monitoring expenses." 4 The measure of his recovery is the expected cost
of those procedures required for the protection of his health. This amount,
though still subject to dispute and debate and differing opinions is
something that the law is quite capable of valuing, more or less
accurately."
Likewise, if an exposed individual suffers damage and injury due
to the emotional distress resulting from the knowledge of his exposure, he
can recover for that distress. While this is not as easily valued as the cost
of medical testing, it is still something that is well within the experience
and ability of the courts to handle.4"4 While less precise in amount than
medical monitoring expenses, damages for emotional distress still involve
valuing events that have already happened. Therefore, a factual basis
exists upon which to make an award. The fear of fraud in the area of
emotional distress has led to certain procedural requirements and increased
burdens of proof such as the requirement of physical injury, but this is not
an unexpected or unreasonable development."7
What is going to happen in the future is the key question for claims
for increased risk claims. It is a question that is beyond the ability of the
courts to accurately answer. Because of that, the chance of a wrong
441. See Rosenberg, supra note 5.
442. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 4, at 23.
443. Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
444. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987).
445. DORE, supra note 18, at § 7.05[1].
446. Dworkin, supra note 174.
447. ld; Payton v. Abott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
19941
352 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol.18:285
answer which either grants compensation needlessly or erroneously denies
it is very high. This large chance of error causes the hurdle of the burden
of proof to be set so high that only the clearest and most convincing of
cases can surmount it. Exposure to a hazardous substance resulting in an
increase in one's risk of getting a serious disease is an injury, but one that,
in most cases, is beyond the ability of medicine, science or the courts to
quantify. Furthermore, in the absence of physical harm simple exposure
ought not be compensated, because it is too small, too uncertain, and too
widespread." 8
As the likelihood of the possible harm increases, it may reach the
point where it becomes more likely than not the disease in question will
occur. The harm then becomes compensable. Fifty percent is admittedly
an arbitrary figure but it is a reasonable enough figure, particularly when
a later cause of action for the future disease is allowed if and when the
disease occurs.
Nonimpact damages are how tort law has responded to new and
differing mechanisms of injury. They serve the aims of society by
attempting to allocate costs between those who benefit from the
defendant's acts, and those that are the unintentional victims of it.
Unfortunately, neither the courts nor the federal government has yet
articulated a coherent, just policy to compensate parties suffering
nonimpact injuries.
448. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 4, at 23; Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.
2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
